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“When people and events come to be regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some 
governmental or other entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting 
alternative designations such as ‘martyr’ and ‘liberation struggle’.” 
 
Austin T. Turk.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In much of terrorism research, (...) attempt at objectivity is abandoned and analysts behave as if 
alleged terrorists are guilty until proven innocent.” 
Sageman, M.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Turk (2004): 271 - 272. 
2
 Sageman (2014): 571. 
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Introduction 
 
The Theatre of Terrorist Terminology 
On reading through the NRC newspapers’ article “A Jewish perpetrator is hardly ever a terrorist”, I 
realized that the ‘Palestinian terrorist’ stigma needed to be analysed academically.3 The article 
suggested that Palestinians, the Orientals or Others, are more likely to be labelled ‘terrorist’ than 
their Jewish counterparts, who are portrayed as ‘perpetrators’. Therefore, as I called to mind the 
saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, 4 and this thesis entails a literature 
study, I became inspired to scrutinize the academic usage of the ‘Palestinian terrorist’ label.  
 Saids’ framework of Orientalism relates to this thesis’ main research question: “To what 
extent does a neo-Orientalist framing of ‘Palestinian terrorists’ occur in the journal Terrorism and 
Political Violence?”. The key aspect of this framework, is that a Western, intellectually-rooted, 
understanding of a violent, irrational, antimodernist and usually Muslim/Oriental counterpart, seems 
to coincide with the present-day portrayal of terrorists (Said 2003: 45, Jackson 2005: 47). In the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Twin Towers attack, president G.W. Bush in his War On Terror, 
for example, claimed that America was targeted as a result of “irrationality, ingratitude, a clash of 
civilizations and a hatred for ‘our way of life’” (Silberstein 2002: XII). From this perspective, it seems 
that his war against the concept of terror takes after Samuel Huntington’s idea of a civilizational-
clash where the civilized us, that is ‘the West’, faces threats from an uncivilized ‘Rest’, typically 
meaning Muslims (Huntington 1996, Jackson 2005: 47, Esposito in Malik 2002: 14/15). Hence, 
corresponding with Saids’ impute of imperial European civil servants who relied on academic-
engrained prejudice to sketch a mystic, sensual yet barbaric Oriental, this thesis investigates if and 
subsequently how neo-Orientalist tenets appear in the scientific representation of terrorists. Do 
terrorism representors such as Freilich (2015), Silber (2010) and Frisch (2005) alienate/Other their 
subjects, that is Palestinian terrorists? 
 Notwithstanding that terrorist attacks equal atrocious events, I highlight that public/scholar 
condemnation of such unethical “barbarian acts” is influenced by the so-called terrorism 
discourse: ”a highly complex and intertwined set of narratives and rhetorical strategies that aims 
to reinforce the authority of the state and reify its disciplinary practices” (Jackson 2005: 178). Here I 
take into account Saids’ critique concerning contemporary scholarship Othering of Muslim violence 
                                                          
3
 The NRC Newspapers’ article “Een Joodse aanslagpleger is zelden een terrorist” Via: 
http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/10/16/eenjoodse-aanslagpleger-is-zelden-een-terrori-1546932, last accessed on 
May 8, 2016. 
4
 While following the course ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism’ supervised by Prof. E. Bakker, Campus The 
Hague, University Leiden, I often heard Laquer’s famous quotation “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedomfighter” (1987: 7, 302). 
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(neo-Orientalism).           
 By means of a qualitative, text-based inquiry (discourse analysis) the scientific relevance of 
my thesis consists of an unique anthropological linguistic evaluation of the ‘booming’ field of 
terrorism studies.5 By deploying Saids’ ‘ruler’ of Orientalism, I Study whether the terrorist-expert, is 
truly that unbiased, impartial and objective as they themselves believe they are (Ringmar 2013).
 Also, I establish that the individual assessment of violence, as being good, bad or something 
in between, is actually a culturally-embedded evaluation. Here I address the problematical nature of 
terror and the societal assessment of illegitimate violence. For e.g. to denounce terrorism on the 
assumption that it mirrors morally unjust behavior could be problematic since “morality is always the 
morality of a particular community” (MacIntyre 1984: 8). In line with this, any public confronted with 
terrorist threats should bear in mind that a political designation of ‘unlawful terrorism’ might mirror 
symbolic violence as underlying reasons entailing delegitimization of dissident parties (Bhatia 2005: 
7).6 In other words, we need to be skeptical of generalized questions like ‘why should we negotiate 
with terrorists since their goals are death and suffering?’. Such an attitude might be the unfortunate 
result of entities depoliticizing ‘terrorists’ and their goals (Bhatia 2005: 13).  
The belief that terrorists do not adopt terrorism as a means but as an end relates to the risks 
of the counterterrorism campaign in promoting human rights violations. For e.g. the real-world 
consequences of rendering a war against those who “don’t represent any civilization” epitomizes a 
terrorist enemy who belongs to the “outside realm”, an animal.7 This, in turn, normalizes 
disproportionate retaliatory violence seen in Abu Graib and Guantanamo Bay, prisons notorious for 
their “rigorous interrogation techniques” (Jackson 2005: 49/73, Silberstein 2002 : 89).8 
Language partially determines how we behave socially. This thesis therefore, addresses 
another problem related to the term ‘terrorism’; in that it seems to cherish stereotype classification 
of the groups most often associated with terrorism i.e. Islam and the Muslim community. Arab 
Muslims, especially after 9/11, are systematically considered radical devout Others (Saeed 2007: 459). 
This justifies my elaboration of racist ideas such as “Why do the majority of Muslims hate us [the 
West]?” and “What is it in the Qu’ran that justifies terrorism and hijackings?”. Such neo-Orientalist 
assumptions signify that terrorism always refers to the actions of Others and never those of 
                                                          
5
 ‘Booming’ relates to the impact of 9/11 and the sudden urge to understand why someone turns to political 
violence (Phillips 2014: 225, Sageman 2014: 566). 
6
 Perhaps the readership of the journal I myself examined as well. 
7
 To quote former U.S. secretary of defense D.H. Rumsfeld, 7 October, 2001 on terrorism being a “cancer on 
the human condition” (Jackson 2005: 49). 
8
 The part of “these assassins don’t represent any civilization” mirrors French President Hollande his response 
to the perpetrators behind the november 2015, Bataclan attack in Paris as he spoke about “barbarian acts”, “an 
act of war” instigated by “barbaric” Daesh (Islamic State); Hollande, F; Via: http://www.humanite.fr/francois-
hollande-cest-un-acte-de-guerre-589684, last accesed on  June 4, 2016. 
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Westerners and/or non-Muslims (Yamaguchi 2012: 242, Esposito in Malik 2002: 13, Sageman 2014: 
566). 
This thesis consists of four chapters and I provide three sub questions to answer my main 
research question: The first sub question: “what is neo-Orientalist framing?”, is clarified in ‘Chapter 1. 
neo-Orientalism’. Here I firstly discuss the underlying framework of Orientalism. After that, I explain 
existing insights, theories and ideas that relate to the concept of neo-Orientalism. 
My second sub question involves “what makes the Israel-Palestine conflict a favored 
background for a neo-Orientalist description of an ongoing struggle between the West and the Rest, 
typically Islam?”. This will be introduced in Chapter 2. Methodology’ in conjunction with a brief 
historical outline of the Israel-Palestine conflict (Chapter 2.1). 
My third sub question entails “in what way does neo-Orientalism disclose itself in relation to 
the framing of Palestinian terrorists in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence?”. This sub 
question will be answered in Chapter 3. ‘Discourse Analysis’, which encompasses examination of the 
literature. 
In the conclusion ‘Chapter 4. “Voyeuristic Terrorism-experts” the many problems concerning a 
lack of a definition of terrorism will be underlined. Overall, I examine if and to what extent, the 
caricature of the Muslim-terrorist emerges through a possibly academic-stirred war of words 
(Silberstein 2002).  
Chapter 1. Neo-Orientalism 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part, “Orientalism” named after the framework of Said, 
deals with the intellectually-ingrained Western prejudice towards Muslims. The second part “neo-
Orientalism” outlines the belief that when it comes to the war on terror, an Orientalist dichotomy of 
the us “civilized West” versus them “barbaric Rest” seems to reemerge. From this perspective, 
measurement criteria to gauge neo-Orientalist tenets will also be defined. Furthermore, the 
contrasts, between the old, literal and classic frameworks of Orientalism and the apparent enduring 
mode of neo-Orientalism, are presented. 
 
1.1) Orientalism 
The book, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of The Orient, was published in 1978 by the Palestinian 
historian Edward Said.9 This author argues that ‘the West’ (Occident) cherishes, and still actually 
encourages, a flawed, biased view regarding ‘the East’ (Orient) and its inhabitants, mostly Muslims 
                                                          
9
 Said, a fervent supporter of the Palestinian cause, was born in Jerusalem in 1935. Unfortunately he died in 
New York in 2003. Via: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/palestine/resources/edwardsaid.html, last accessed May 
30, 2016. 
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(Orientals or Others) (Said 2003: 40). The Orientalist project embodies a prejudice, deeply rooted in 
Western academic tradition and therefore also in Western society (p. 40).10 The European colonial 
officials, mainly Franco-British philologists who, from the early 18th century onwards, permeated the 
Middle-East and provided us, ‘the West’, with the portrait of a racially different them, namely 
Islamite’s and Muslims (Orientals) (p. 45). These civil servants, the early Middle-East area 
anthropologists11, (literally)12 (mis)represented the Orientals, as being sensual, mysterious and 
primitive. According to Said, the fact that the Western intellectual praxis drew such a picture 
coincides with the assumption that the worldview of the Western individual differed drastically from 
the Muslim one. In other words, whereas Orientalist officials proposed that the Muslim frame of 
mind revolved around a religion based on familialism, tribalism and clan-like behavior, a secular 
Westerner relied upon reason (ratio). According to Said, the fact that Orientals could be seen as 
irrational actors was due to the Western assumption that Muslims were forever trapped in the realm 
of orthodox Islam, a medieval doctrine that merely upheld backwardness. Their lives, after all, were 
all about pleasing Allah to find salvation in the hereafter.      
 Moreover, Said claims that Orientalist rendering of the savage Other promoted the construct 
of Western identity as being the progressive, dynamic and modern counterpart of the Orientals’. 
Apparently Westerners only existed as a contrast to the Oriental Other implying that Westerners 
extract their identity from that which it presumes not to be; the primitive, treacherous, violent Other 
(Said [1978] in Jackson 2005: 48).  
In this way, European imperialist expansion to the inferior ‘East’ did not only take a political 
and economic form but also a cultural one (Saeed 2007: 446). Correspondingly, a Western 
demonization of the Oriental, ‘justified’ imperial conquest over the Middle-East. Its motives, 
according to Said, were to be interpreted as a civilization effort, the so-called mission civilisatrice (p. 
169). After all, to put Western humanitarian values onto the non-Western ‘rest’, Orientals, became a 
self-evident or scientific supported ‘duty’. On this topic, the Western hegemonic expansion under the 
pretense of transmission of civilization, Said articulates: 
 
“(..) Orientalism is not just a vicarious experience of marvels of the East: it is not just some vague 
imaging about what the Orient is, although there is some of that there. But it really has to do with 
how you control actual populations, it is associated with the actual domination of 
                                                          
10
 Scientific knowledge attains the status of authentic representation, and is therefore seen as the portal that 
provides the ‘truth’.  
11
 Said mentions French and British imperial powers’ linguistic experts, artists and musicians as most notably 
influencing, shaping and constructing Western (mis)perceptions regarding the Orient.  
12
 Orientalist painters portrayed Middle-Eastern exoticism. Artpieces like Moorish Bath (1870) painted by Jean-
Léon Gérôme (French, 1824–1904), on the cover of Said (2003) - for instance, illustrates the mysterious and 
sensual nature of the Oriental thru a style named realism: painting the truth? 
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the Orient, beginning with Napoleon.”13  
 
In other words, Western Orientalist texts and descriptions of a cryptic yet distinctive cruel them thus 
became the pretext to conquer the decadent Orient. Since Said argues that knowledge, the way to 
convey others of the ‘truth’, is perceived as synchronous to power over Others, he refers to 
Foucault’s notion of discourse (p. 3). Said views the discursive formation of the Orient as a self-
fulfilling prophecy where the one-way, asymmetrical construction and distribution of knowledge 
entails the main problem of Orientalism. According to Said, European excavators were able to re-
impose colonial domination as, via travelogues and historical accounts, they controlled how the 
Orient was approached/known. In other words, imperial literary texts, poetry, and paintings ‘created’ 
knowledge about what was ‘out there’, the exterior.14 However an imagined Orient, a reality was 
produced on their behalf (p. 22). This explains why Said cited Karl Marxian saying “they cannot 
represent themselves, they must be represented”. As a result, it became the career for a Western 
intellectual (the voyeuristic, seemingly neutral agent”) to represent, or mis-represent, the Others (p. 
3, 94, Saeed 2007: 453). Violence, in this sense, became the product of the innate ferocious Others, 
specifically the Muslims and never ourselves, ‘the West’. 
 The purpose of my thesis’ is to gauge whether, and if so, to what extent, terrorism scholars 
reveal a neo-Orientalist style of writing to describe Palestinian violence (Chapter 3.). Reasons for the 
prefix ‘neo’ will also be elaborated upon. The following section provides answers to the first sub 
question: “What is neo-Orientalist framing?”  
 
1.2) Neo-Orientalism 
It has been said that the phenomenon of Western (mis)representation of Orientals still exists. 
Muslims are, according to many scholars, still portrayed as being racially different to Westerners 
(Behdad & Williams 2012). Yet the present context in which the Othering/Orientalizing occurs today 
differs from the past context. The so-called “War On Terror” narrative is understood to provide 
Orientalism, a mode of representation, with another guise, i.e. that of the Muslim-terrorist 
symbolizing the “new barbarian” (Amin-Khan 2012: 1595, Jackson 2005: 47). This invites us to 
examine what the “War on Terror” narrative actually entails (Hodges 2011).    
 Washington declared a state of emergency after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It recognized that 
it faced “immediate security challenges” and the attacks were to be perceived as an “act of war” and 
this generation’s “Pearl Harbor” (Achcar 2002: 20, Hodges 2011: 7, Roth 2004: 13, Silberstein 2002: 
1). In line with this, prevalent news banners appeared on television channels, for example “America 
                                                          
13
 Quote from an interview with Gauri Viswanathan (2001: 169). 
14
 Said even considers figures like Shakespeare Orientalist (Said 2003: 31).  
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Under Attack” “America’s New War” and “War against Terrorism” were seen on CNN News (Jackson 
2005: 166, Silberstein 2002: 1).         
 By the same token, it has been said that the former U.S. president Bush became the main 
advocate for a radical dualist worldview. He constantly phrased his consequent Global War on Terror 
in terms of “Good versus Evil”15 and stated that “You are either with us, or with the terrorists” 
(Zulaika 2003: 194, Yamaguchi 2012: 242, Bhatia 2005: 9/16). Besides, Bush’s presidential rhetoric 
seemed to support the assumption that anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism, 9/11 and even terrorism 
in general, resulted from “irrationality, ingratitude and a hatred for ‘our way of life ’and even “a clash 
of civilizations” (Stampnitzky 2013: 166/167, Esposito in Malik 2002: 17, emphasis added).16  
Considering the scholarly view that Orientalist inferences are re-embodied, the above 
reasoning (hereafter: “post-9/11 terrorism discourse, or narrative”) resembles the atmosphere in 
which a revitalization of Orientalism takes place (Amin-Khan 2012: 1596).17 Several arguments 
uphold this assumption. An analogy, concerning the historical Orientalist project and the War on 
Terror discourse, for example, relates to Said’s’ description of a ‘mission civilisatrice’, the imperialist 
project to civilize, or more likely legitimize Western rule over, the savage Orient: 
 
“With war as its pretext, western nations and their allies have resorted to an ever more 
violent Orientalist ideology wherein the ‘besieged cartographies’ of Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Palestine (..) are subjected to a permanent state of exception and emergency in the name of 
global democracy and world civilization”(Yamaguchi 2012: 242, emphasis added rel. to 
thesis). 
In addition, the fact that terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon ties into the universalized facet of 
neo-Orientalism: the ‘Global’ in the Global War on Terror, connotes the prefix neo- added to 
Orientalism. That implies that the image of the eternal struggle between ‘the West’ encountering the 
uncivilized Others, the “savage tribes”, the “devious and ruthless”18 them (terrorists), is no longer 
limited to the Orient. In this way, Kumar states the “Oriental collective that is glutted by seamlessly 
borderless terrorists can no longer be defined in terms of a fixed geographical entity” (Kumar 2012: 
233). In other words, to wage war against a transnational radical goes beyond the geographical 
limited mission civilisatrice, this “new barbarian” may strike at any place, any time. (Jackson 
2005:Ringmar 2013: 264, Amin-Khan 2012: 1602, Jackson 2005: 47).  
                                                          
15
 Bush, according to Stampnitzky, uttered the word “evil” well over 1000 times between his inauguration 
(January 20, 2001) and June 16, 2003 (Stampnitzky 2013: 166). 
16
 In responding to the question “why do they hate us?”: President George W. Bush, adress to Congress and the 
nation on terrorism, September 20, 2001. 
17
 Jackson illustrates the atmosphere as follows: it is a “set of institutional practices and an accompanying set of 
assumptions, beliefs, forms of knowledge and political and cultural narratives” (Jackson 2005: 16/17) 
18
 Bush, 24 november 2001 (see: Jackson 2002: 62). 
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Besides, the Orientalist project and the War on Terror both make use of a dualist, simplistic 
us/them rhetoric (Abukhalil in Malik 2002: 312). E.g.; where former European philologists 
represented the Oriental, a counterterrorism official of nowadays offers us “the official story, the 
dominant frame” vis-à-vis the proclaimed them/Other (terrorists) (Chernus [2006] in Hodges 2011: 
5).19 Correspondingly, the role of Western mainstream media and its mechanisms of “framing” 
terrorists can’t be ignored (Amin-Khan 2012: 1602, Saeed 2007: 453, Jackson 2005: 164).20 The War 
on Terror has in this way, been labelled a “war of images, a battle over representation” and the 
following statement outlines (Creekmur in Birkenstein et al. 2010: 83):  
 
“The power to shape perceptions of violent acts and their principal actors (both perpetrators 
and victims) usually rests not with the terrorists but with the government officials.[21] Who 
the terrorists are in the first place is a question largely determined by these officials. Those 
who have routine access to the mass media, those to whom reporters turn when the dust 
settles and the shooting stops, have the ability to shape coverage and perceptions” 
(Livingston [1994] in Jackson 2005: 166, Silberstein 2002: 3). 
 
Given that neo-Orientalist ‘framing’ distinguishes itself from a classical Orientalist framing in terms of 
relying on journalistic ‘evidence’, it is important to consider that the current assessment and 
understanding of ‘hatred-filled terrorists’ by the West, relies on second hand interpretations. Where 
the West used to find presumptions about the irrational Other on Orientalist “imaginative and travel 
literature”, we nowadays depend on the journalists accounts of violent political acts which, of course, 
entail culturally-embedded interpretations (Said 2003: 99). This is in agreement with the statement 
of Jackson that we tend to get information on terrorism through a “framed” manner (2005: 164). It is 
important to ask what exactly such ‘’framing’’ entails. 
Journalism is known to be driven by attention-grabbing motives and seeks to include what is 
sensational as well as what is not (Bhatia 2005: 10). “Framing”, in this sense involves “selection to 
prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one 
particular interpretation of events” (Norris et al. [2003] in Jackson 2005: 165). Hence, in this thesis I 
aim to identify a scientific resurfacing Orientalist (mis)representation of Others, in this case, 
Palestinian terrorists. It is important to consider the negative consequences of framing terrorism.22 
                                                          
19
 And perhaps, our own (western) non-terrorist identity as well? 
20
 Or in Amin-Khan’s words: “The mainstream Western media has played a pivotal role in the spread of 
incendiary racism within a new Orientalist mould” (Amin Khan 2012: 1602). 
21
 Keep at mind Saids’ Marxian quotation of 'They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented' 
(Said 2003: 94). 
22
 Knowledge, after all, is man-made and one should keep in mind that terrorism scholars witness news frames 
about terrorist acts themselves. 
12 
 
Firstly, the media, the main source of information to the world, generally does not provide us 
with an accurate view of terrorism.23 Since terrorist news reports are “an important evaluation 
standard for judging ‘reality’”, an effect termed media priming, the problem of a simplified, 
decontextualized understanding of terrorist behavior arises (Das et al. 2009: 458, Jackson 2005: 165). 
Secondly and linked to the aforementioned, the media seems to ‘set our agenda’24 with 
respect to what kind of terrorism we actually think of (Das et al. 2009: 454). Accordingly, when media 
attention focuses solely on violence being imminent from the Jihadi, an Oriental angle,25 we 
obviously do not think about other types of terror that stem from, for example, neo-fascist or left-
wing parties.26  
A third complication occurs when journalists’ approach terror events in a non-critical manner. 
Jackson, for example, illustrates that in the wake of 9/11 an increase in highly subjective emotion-
laden commentaries overshadowed alternative, analytical viewpoints (Jackson 2005: 167). The 
conflation of news and entertainment, “Terror-tainment” in this way involves covering the emotional 
responses of people (even colleague reporters) to such actions, rather than the occurrences 
themselves (Silberstein 2002: 62/63). 
Taking these points into account, it is claimed that terrorism news reports encourages the 
“Arabs-equals-bad” stereotype since terror broadcasts constantly and predominantly link terrorism, 
fundamentalism and violence to Islam and Muslims (Das et al. 2009: 458). Regarding this relationship 
Said, for example, contends that in the early 2000s: “(..) both the electronic and print media have 
been awash with demeaning stereotypes that combine Islam and terrorism, or Arabs and violence, or 
the Orient and tyranny” (Said 2003: 347).  According to Nurullah (2010), even popular Western films 
and cinema, can be held responsible for steering our (Western) perception of Islam.27  This can be 
considered a doctrine where fanaticism and violent extremism are fostered (Saeed 2007: 444, 
Birkenstein et al. 2010: 37). 
A further argument for the bias involved in terrorism is that we seem to instantly imagine 
Oriental roots of violence instead of non-Oriental. E.g. according to Kumar, the time gap between the 
Utøya massacre in Norway and the identification of the architect behind it, the Norwegian “extremist” 
                                                          
23
 Or, as Sageman illustrates: “Onedimensional and sensational portraits of alleged terrorists, packaged in the 
fivehundred- words-or-less limit of a newspaper article or a television sound bite, dominate our understanding 
of this phenomenon (Sageman 2014: 570). 
24 
Meaning that “news determines not so much what people think, but what they think about (the agenda 
setting effect)”(McCombs & Shaw [1972] in Das et al. 2009: 454). Also mentioned in Jackson as the “agenda-
setting role (determining the most important issues)” (2005: 165). 
25
 E.g. Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, Hezbollah, ISIL, and so on and so forth 
26
 or at the very least to a lesser extent 
27
 Nurullah critically analyzed the television serial 24, which portrays stereotypical images of Arabs and Muslims, 
and appears to aggravate the ‘othering process’ (Nurullah 2010: 1021). 
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Anders Behring Breivik, wondered “why would Islamic terrorists target such a peace-loving country 
as Norway?” (Kumar 2012: 233).28  
The aforementioned arguments suggest that where former colonial linguists provided us the 
lens to interpret the vicious tempered them, todays’ media and political practices have the power to 
shape public interpretation, of Others as terrorists. This explains why many describe “the language of 
the war on terrorism” as a discursive formation, meaning groups of related statements about a 
subject [i.e. “evil terrorists”] that determine the meaning, characteristics and relationship to the 
other discursive formations [“good, innocent” Westerners]” (Jackson 2005: 19).  
Said used Foucault’s discourse in describing the set of Orientalist assumptions where the 
vicious Oriental opposed the order-maintaining Westerner. From this viewpoint it seems appropriate 
to perceive the ‘War on Terror’ Narrative from Bush as “a type of discursive formation that sustains a 
regime of truth” (Hodges 2011: 5). 
 
1.3) (Terrorism) Scholars neo-Orientalizing violence? 
Said (2003) deals with an intellectual underpinning of European imperial prejudice concerning Others, 
particularly Muslims. It is argued that the post-9/11 narrative predicates itself on intellectual thought 
and predominantly on Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations idea (Jackson 2002: 99, Esposito/El Fadl in 
Malik 2002: 10/19, Tuastad 2003: 592, Amin-Khan 2012: 1595). Huntington has been labelled as a 
biased anti-Islam scholar as he claimed that Western civilization faces threats from ‘the Rest’/Muslim 
world members of which are ‘characterized by an inborn propensity for violence’ (Saeed 2007: 446, 
Amin-Khan 2012: 1595). Also, Huntingtons’ intellectual-political career encourages many to label him 
as a neo-Orientalist scholar (Tuastad 2003: 596, Yamaguchi 2012: 248).29 Importantly, his 
“unapologetic intellectual investment in and engagement with politics contrasts with classical 
Orientalism in that the latter positioned an “apparent privileging of philological, cultural, and 
formalistic concerns over ideological ones” (Behdad & Williams 2012). Correspondingly; beyond 
Huntington’s civilizational-clash notion, neo-Orientalism also concerns the rise of “self-serving and 
ideologically-motivated scholarship in the fields of security studies, terrorism and homeland security” 
(Amin-Khan 2012: 1599, emphasis added).  
It should be mentioned that my study, in principle, examines the validity of the above 
argument on neo-Orientalism. My text-based qualitative discourse analysis seeks to pinpoint if and to 
                                                          
28
 And, as for the assumption that the contemporary West (neo-Occident?) Orientalizes terrorism - it is 
interesting to witness that when the perpetrator eventually did got exposed, he became known being a wacko, 
a psyschopath killing for pleasure, though notparticularly a ‘terrorist’ (Dabashi [2011] in Kumar 2012: 233). As 
we can (not) see here: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/europe/anders-behring-breivik-murder-
trial.html?_r=0, last accessed on 25th of March 2016. 
29
 As Tuastad highlights: “Huntington has been an important figure in US foreign policy since the Vietnam War, 
and has been a member of the National Security Council” (Tuastad 2003: 593). 
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what extent, political meanings and views are accurate in the field of terrorism studies. I do this in 
accordance with a list of criteria, or indicators, that define a neo-Orientalist presence.  
 
Indicators 
It is important to determine what has been reported to date about neo-Orientalist scholarship. Who 
are considered to be the main proponents? What standpoints are relevant in analyzing a possible 
neo-Orientalist sentiment in terrorism studies?  
Prominent figures leading the “neo-Orientalist sentiment” are the intellectuals Robert Kaplan, 
Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Raphael Patai, Patricia Crone, and Samuel Huntington (Tuastad 2003, 
Samiei 2010, Sadowski 1993, Amin-Khan 2012, Yamaguchi 2012, Said 2003, Saeed 2007). Their 
viewpoints are the parameters which I will employ to gauge neo-Orientalism using the following 
three indicators: 
 
“Men of tribal origin” 30: The first indicator type, or neo-Orientalist angle, encompasses ascribing the 
Palestinian terrorist feature of cultural backwardness, as having a distinct propensity for violence. I 
inferred this insight from scholar’s decrees about Kaplan and Lewis. Lewis’ article ‘The roots of 
Muslim Rage”, for example, states that “significant numbers of Muslims are ready to approve, and a 
few of them to apply, this [extremist] interpretation of their religion”. In line with this, a portrait of a 
tribalist-minded terrorist is painted where: "fighting in many ways is not a means but an end" 
(Tuastad 2003: 593). Kaplan underwrites such a belief in neo-Orientalist style (Samiei 2010: 1152-
1153):  
“In places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has 
always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence (…) Physical aggression 
is part of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational, 
and cultural standard is this trait tranquillized” (Kaplan [2000] in Tuastad 2003: 593). 
 
The above also relates to Huntington’s viewpoint of religiously- inspired terrorism. He perceives 
Islam as a “religion of the sword and a religion that glorifies military virtues” and thereby sketches a 
usually secular Western as being incapable and less prone to turn to violence (Tuastad 2003: 594). In 
other words, this viewpoint invites us to focus on hints that Palestinian terrorists usually favor bombs 
(metaphorically ‘sword’) over dialogue, diplomacy and conciliation (Tuastad 2003: 596). An 
insinuation that Palestinian terrorists typically tend to adopt terrorism because they are promised life 
in the hereafter, which relates to the Islamic embedded cult of “martyrdom”, also reveals an 
Orientalist perspective. If this concerns the main alleged motive why Palestinians turn themselves 
                                                          
30
 After Sadowski 1993: 17. 
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into ‘human bombs’, a real-time neo-imperialist influence in the Middle-East is downplayed, which 
according to the Norwegian anthropologist Dag Tuastad is characteristic for neo-Orientalists. Neo-
Orientalist thought suggests that violence typically stems from periphalized people, such as 
Palestinians, though neither looks beyond Islamic-embedded drives (Tuastad 2003: 591). 
Similar to the belief that terrorists are typically violent, an indicator of neo-Orientalist 
exercise consists of attributing irrationality to Palestinian terrorists . For example, Tuastad writes: 
“Imaginaries of 'terrorism' and 'Arab Mind backwardness’ can be seen as closely connected. The 
backwardness indicates the irrationality of terrorism; that violence is the product of backward 
cultures (Tuastad 2003: 595, emphasis in original).31  
 
“Enemies of democracy”: The second indicator concerns the presented ‘fact’ that Palestinian 
violence is characteristically anti-democratic and anti-Western. An author considered as neo-
Orientalist and who relates the depiction of a undemocratic, more susceptible to adopt terrorism 
Oriental is Daniel Pipes (Sadowski 1993: 14). In his publication “The Muslims are Coming! The 
Muslims are Coming!” in National Review he argues that “Muslim countries have the most terrorists 
and the fewest democracies in the world” (Pipes 1990: 29, Tuastad 2003: 594). This reveals why the 
caricature of the anti-democratic terrorist is included as a neo-Orientalist indicator. Bearing in mind 
that war is waged against those who allegedly undermine global peace, international security and 
democracy, Pipes hints at an unambiguous distinction between the usual pseudo or un-democratic 
Muslim country and the established Western secular/democratic environment. From this view, 
peaceful democracies are less likely, or even unable to ‘raise’ terrorists whereas corrupt Muslim 
countries, characterized by dictorial regimes that in Pipes words “got to power through force” rather 
than election, purportedly do (Bhatia 2005: 17). These authors suggest that a dichotomy 
terrorism/democracy should be looked for because it hints at terrorism being more likely than for the 
Other/non-Western entity. 
The presumption that nationhood and state authority is (forever) incompatible with 
Arab/Islamic culture is proposed as another sign of the neo-Orientalist framing of terrorists. This 
decision relates to the following neo-Orientalist slant from Patricia Crone: “Islamic civilization was 
unique in the way that it refused to legitimize political authority” (Crone in Tuastad 2003: 594).32 
Taking the views of Pipes and Lewis, who uphold the ‘undemocratic Arab’ contraction into account, 
Crone’s statement insinuates that Islam’s particularistic and divine-orientated nature obstructs the 
                                                          
31
 Note that both Tuastad and Said, in his chapter “Orientalism Now” deal with neo-Orientalist Raphael Patai 
and his book titled The Arab Mind (Tuastad 2003: 592/595, Said 2003:285). 
32
 Patricia Crone has been described as the most persuasive and rigorous of the neo-Orientalists (Tuastad 2003: 
594). 
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creation of political authority in the Middle-East, and thereby stability. In Crone’s words the Arab 
Islamic loyalty lies at “the divine” and “kinship based ideological localism” rather than political rule’.  
Against the backdrop of the neo-Orientalist viewpoint that through Islam, despotism and 
ultimately terrorism is fostered, or at the very least does not provide a threshold to counter, a 
parameter to gauge neo-Orientalism is acknowledged. Any characterization of anti-democratic, anti-
state-institution minded terrorists echoes the neo-Orientalist assumption that Arabs are resistant to 
democratization (Yamaguchi 2012: 242).  
 
“Out-of-context”: The last theme that suggests a neo-Orientalist vision involves an explanation of 
Palestinian terrorist acts in a decontextualized setting. This relates to the scholars’ insight that neo-
Orientalists normally tend to define ‘Islamist terror’ while denying the U.S./Western militaristic, or as 
will be explained later, Israel’s neo-colonial expansionist influences with regard to the Middle-East 
(Behdad & Williams 2012, Tuastad 2003: 591).33 To further justify use of this specific indicator type, 
background information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is given in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 Methodology  
The previous theoretical chapter outlined the basis of the main research question of my thesis: neo-
Orientalism, or more precisely, neo-Orientalist framing. In this section the arguments for the chosen 
background will be provided by presenting the casus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The answer to 
subquestion 2 “what makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a favored background for the neo-
Orientalist description of a ongoing struggle between the West and the Rest, typically Islam?” is 
outlined in section 2.1. 
Also, as my discourse analysis encompasses a case study of the journal Terrorism and Political 
Violence, the reasons for the selection of this particular journal are discussed (2.2). 
 
2.1) The Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
In the literature that deals with the concept of neo-Orientalism, many articles put forward the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict as a favored background for neo-Orientalists to present their thoughts about the 
ongoing struggle between Western civilization and the Others.34 For e.g. Huntington referred to this 
conflict by stating “Islam’s borders are bloody” (Huntington [1996] in Samiei 2010: 1152) and Kaplan 
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 Tuastad: “(...)the production of enemy imaginaries contributes to legitimise continuous colonial economic or 
political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” (Tuastad 2003: 591). 
34
 For example, Abukhalil in Malik 2002: 312, Samiei 2010: 1152, Yamaguchi 2012: 242. 
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unapologetically states: Israel constitutes a “line of defense”, “a fortress amidst a vast and volatile 
Islam” (Kaplan [2000] Tuastad 2003: 596). 
The decision to study ‘framing’ of particularly ‘Palestinian terrorists’ in this thesis partly 
resulted from the widely-held view that neo-Orientalist scholarship could be held responsible for 
misrepresenting Palestinians as individuals with a propensity for violence. This is illustrated by Alroy 
who claims that Palestinian resistance against Israel results from the ‘fact’ that “Arabs are a fiercely 
vengeful people” and Waschitz who states that Palestinians “lack the 'psychological readiness', the 
cultural qualities that are needed to be members of a democratic society” (Alroy / Waschitz in 
Tuastad 2003: 592). Since both Israel and Palestine are located in the ‘East’ the neo-Orientalist 
dualist approach to terrorism in terms of Occident/Orient, good/evil or civilization/barbarism does 
not seem to hold. It is believed however that following Bush’s Global War on Terror, Israel quickly 
legitimized its own ‘war on terror’, by aligning itself with the counterterrorism campaign ( Zulaika 
2003: 194, Malik 2002: 268). According to Lowrie, for example, the Israeli media tactically applied a 
“war of words” in which it named the identity of the Palestinian terrorists, the bad guys, while Israel, 
always appearing to be the ‘good guys’ came to be the defender of freedom in the Middle-East 
(Lowrie in Malik 2002:249):  
 
“In Israeli media, the term terrorist is always used to describe a person perpetrating acts of 
violence against Israeli persons or property. These include Palestinian suicide bombers, those 
attacking military targets within and without the occupied territory”. (..) Actions by Israeli 
armed forces however are routinely described as ‘targeted killings’, ‘retaliatory’ or ‘accidents’” 
(Lowrie in Malik 2002: 252). 
 
This implies that in Israel’s war on terrorism, the discursive construction of the Palestinian terrorist, 
the villain or the external Other, reinforces its binary opposite, meaning the Jewish Israeli victim who 
like other members of Western democracies (the Occident) merely acts on self-defense (Abukhalil in 
Malik 2002: 313). According to Tuastad, Israel ‘proceeded’ in the construction of the Arab Palestinian 
terrorist/Other. This author in reference to pre-9/11 times, reports that: “Since the state was 
founded, Israel has insisted on representing Judeo-Christian morality, ie, on symbolising Western 
civilisation” (Tuastad 2003: 596).        
 In summary, the choice to deal with the framing of Palestinian terrorism thus relates to two 
points. Firstly, the Palestinian terrorist stigma: the belief that Palestinian restistance orginizations, if 
not whole the Palestinian population, are victims of symbolic violence as the occupying power Israel 
systematically represents their opposition with cries of terrorist behavior (Tuastad 2003: 591).35 
                                                          
35
 Symbolic violence corresponds with Bhatia statement that naming does hurt (Bhatia 2005: 6). 
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Secondly, and related, the neo-Orientalist intellectual culture seems to translate the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict into a symbolic war where the West (again) encounters the “irrational, non-reasoning 
and illogical Muslim”. This motivated me to scrutizine the academic view of the Palestinian terrorist. 
Importantly, I was captivated by Tuastad’s view that neo-Orientalist scholarship tends to reduce the 
Palestinian national struggle to an effort which relies on immoral means and violations of the rules of 
war, while they omit neo-imperial influences in the Middle-East as the underlying motivation.  
 
Background  
As this thesis engages with (the framing of) Palestinian violence, it is important to briefly consider 
a broader context. To delineate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its causes in one paragraph is not 
possible. Cleveland & Bunton (2003), however, summarized the historical background of this conflict. 
They sketch the origins of the conflict as follows: “a small piece of territory [now partly Palestine] 
that had been inhabited by an Arab majority for some 12,000 years was promised by a third party 
(Great Britain)36 as a national home to another people (the international Jewish community), the 
majority of whom lived in Eastern Europe” (p. 250).37 These authors also noted that up to the birth of 
Israel in 1948, the year which Britain ended its mandatory rule over the Jewish state (p. 221), the 
ultra-nationalist Jewish wing tried to get rid of what was then an already weakened British 
government.38 Interestingly, sabotage campaigns from the so-called Irgun & Lehi ultra-Zionist 
movements in Palestine from 1945 - 1947 were labelled as terrorist acts (p. 243, Esposito in Malik 
2002: 27).           
 Jewish and Palestinian claims to this territory grew more aggressive after the circumstances 
of the 1948 war between Israel and the invading forces of Arab states (p. 243). The Arab attempt to 
dissolve Israel ended disastrously in 1949 and a rise of Western, and long-term U.S support to the 
Israeli’s was not welcomed by the Arab world.39 Palestinian Arab discontent about the consequences 
of British imperialism and Jewish determination developed into increased resistance during the years 
to follow. It is this view which makes the study of (the framing of) Palestinian terrorism contentious. 
Palestinian’s displaced from their homeland and put into refugee camps created a desperate, 
hopeless position for the Palestinian community. 
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, there was a Six-Day War, or June War in 1967. Again, Israel 
prevailed to survive and the failure of its opponents, the combined Arab forces of Egypt, Syria, and 
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 To be clear, Britain held colonial rule from 1917-1948 (p. 221). 
37
 To illustrate the sudden demographic change “Palestinians possessed a population majority of approximately 
eight to one [Jews] in 1922 but became a minority in 1948” (p. 221) 
38
 Think of: “Lehi 1944 assassination of the British minister of state for the Middle East, Lord Moyne” (p. 243), 
or “Irgun terror (such as the blowing up in 1946 of a wing of Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, headquarters to 
both civil and the military administrations of Palestine” (p. 244). 
39
 The Palestinian 1948 exodus became known in the Arab World as: the “disaster”, or Al-Nakbah (p. 250). 
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Jordan, led a pivotal change of political power structures in the Middle-East (p. 254). The continued 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip reinforced feelings of Palestinian nationalism 
and contributed to the rise of organizations that endeavored to establish the Palestinian state (p. 
316). 
Meanwhile, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (or PLO, founded during the Arab League 
summit, Cairo 1964) and its chairman Yasser Arafat, succeeded to bring the Palestinian effort to the 
geo-political agenda (p. 323). Palestinian hijackings of airliners, perceived by many word leaders as a 
new kind of terrorism, peaked during the 1970s. In many ways the tactic of hostage-taking 
‘internationalized’ terrorism since (Western) media extensively covered these political events. It also 
led to a world opinion regarding the Palestinian cause and the various parties involved (p. 343).40 The 
PLO eventually splintered into various factions, one of which is Fatah (p. 336). 
There were two major Palestinian national civil uprisings, the so-called Intifadas, which were 
brutally suppressed by Israeli Defense Forces, Israel’s army. International condemnation of (p. 439-
444) (see Table 2. for more information). From the onset of the First Intifada (1987-1993), the 
Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist Hamas movement was established which, up till now, is 
regarded being a terrorist organization by many (Western) states (p. 443).  
 
2.2) Case study: the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence 
The collection and consequent discourse analysis of articles that might portray Palestinian terrorists 
as Others was a stepwise process. Firstly, in considering influential journals for the study of terrorism 
in general, I studied different platforms for prominent journals and their rankings. Many websites,41 
publications (Bullis & Irving 2013: 119/125) and books (Stampnitzky 2013: 15/16) referred to the 
journal Terrorism and Political Violence as being distinguished and this journal is often quoted. 
Before I went further with this journal however, I looked up the journal’s impact factor, which 
according to ResearchGate, the largest academic social network with more than 8 million users,42 is 
0.77. 43 Terrorism and Political Violence has thus a major influence in the field of terrorism studies. 
Besides, the journal’s long-term existence, since 1989, is also impressive.44 Furthermore, I noted from 
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 To name some actors; the Jordanian government that struggled with growing PLO interference (Black 
September). Lebanon and Tunis, both for a while PLO’s safe haven. Egypt,  
41
 I.e: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/258/html, last accessed on May 13, 
2016.  
42
 Via: http://www.nature.com/news/online-collaboration-scientists-and-the-social-network-1.15711, last 
accessed on March 25, 2016. 
43
 Via: https://www.researchgate.net/journal/0954-6553_Terrorism_and_Political_Violence, last accessed on 
March 16, 2016. 
44
 Compared to other journals reporting terrorism studies such as Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
Terrorism (2006 -current), Behavorial Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (2009 - current) and 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (1977 - current) - only the last-mentioned seems to pre-date Terrorism and 
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the journal’s slogan that it draws upon “many disciplines and theoretical perspectives as well as 
comparative approaches to provide some of the most groundbreaking work in a field that has 
hitherto lacked rigour”.45 Finally, informed of the reputations of terrorism authors (Phillips 2015: 229, 
Stampnitzky 2013: 34), I noticed that the editorial board is represented by many famous terrorism 
researchers.46 For all these reasons, I was determined to analyze the journal Terrorism and Political 
Violence.47 
Secondly, since the journal ideally should approach the Palestinian terrorist stigma, I realized 
it would be wise to compile a list of articles related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most 
effective method to accomplish this, that is to search based on self-fabricated keywords, was not 
used since it relied on personal knowledge of the conflict i.e., a non-inclusive, biased starting point.48 
With this limitation, I broadened my scope to the use of terms, historical events and political parties 
which are typically affiliated with this conflict (see: Table 1 Attachments). 
 
Quantitative Preliminary Analysis 
I began to index the journal Terrorism and Political Violence and found a total of 110 issues, in 28 
volumes (see: Table 2 attachments). I compiled a list of article titles that suggested relevancy with 
the conflict and began my quest with Issue 1, volume 1 from 1989. When I had doubt about the 
relevancy of publications from the titles, I looked for cues in the abstracts. The final result is given in 
Table 3. (see Attachments).          
 I then determined which type of terrorism got most attention: I reassessed the list in Table 3 
according to Jewish (JT), Palestinian (PT), both or neither (B/N) sorts of terrorism (see Table 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Political Violence, though it is commonly perceived of as still less distinguished. Its impact factor: 0.41 being 
lower than Terrorism and Political violence (0.77) Via: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/258/html, last accessed on March 25, 2016. 
45
 Interestingly, if many discplines are involved it could be the case that anthropologists who describe, explain 
and represent terrorism involve themselves in the journal(and in neo-Orientalism) too? 
46
 Via: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=editorialBoard&journalCode=ftpv20#. 
VzX6m-J94dV, last accessed on on 25th of March 2016Think, for instance of Martha Crenshaw (Stanford 
University, CA), Beatrice A. de Graaf (Utrecht University, the Netherlands), Bruce Hoffman (Georgetown 
University, Washington DC), Marc Sageman (Foreign Policy Research Institute, PA) and Leonard Weinberg 
(University of Nevada, NV) and so on. Via: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=editorialBoard&journalCode=ftpv20#.Vznhb_l9
7Gg, last accessed on on 25th of March 2016. 
47
 Via: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=ftpv20#. 
VzXxMOJ94dU, last accessed on March 25, 2016. 
48
 I.e: to not incorporate an article titled “Does a coercive response deter terrorism? The case of the PLO (Le 
Vine & Salert 2007)”, for not knowing what the abbreviation PLO actually stands for - Palestinian Liberation 
Organization -, I would had overlooked a potential neo-Orientalist publication with the Jewish-Palestine conflict 
as its frame of reference. 
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Attachments)49. Seven articles featured and highlighted Jewish terrorism (JT) compared to 22 for 
Palestinian terrorism (PT).50 There were 28 remaining articles (B/N) i.e, those which included both 
types (JT+PT, though in comparison less prominently JT) or from further in-depth research of these 
articles, neither JT nor PT were patently framed. 
Taking into account the precondition of a 5-year interval, l I then extracted a sample of 
articles from Table 4. I choose 3 articles from category PT and 3 from category BN, double checking if 
(PT) was actually included. Only these two categories might reveal a neo-Orientalist framing.51 
Importantly, the reason behind the exclusion of category JT relates to the topic of my thesis: neo-
Orientalist framing of (PT) Palestinian terrorism and not Jewish radicalism. And as outlined in section 
2.1, against the backdrop of war against terror where Israel appears to lean towards the West 
(Occident) part of the dichotomies West/Others, Occident/Orient. 
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 Meaning with in-depth research that I read all the abstracts and if that did not disclose JT, PT Iused the 
control-f function: inserted words such as terrorism, terror, terrorist and tried to identify antecedents (JT or PT) 
within close proximity? 
50
 Meaning that the clear contraction “Palestinian terrorism (PT)” repeatedly surfaced. A finding that will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. discourse analysis. 
51
 Given that I had 3 themes to consider (Men of tribal origin, Enemies of Democracy, Out-of-Context) I 
anticipated that I would be meaningful to at least incorporate 6 articles qua length of the foresaw content. 
Additionaly, I distilled articles that dated from widespread publication dates as that reflected a measurement 
of (possible) neo-Orientalism over not one time specific paradigm, but multiple scientific climates . Put 
differently, I foresaw that neither decrease nor an increase of a a neo-Orientalist tone amongst academia 
would have been recognized if I concentrated solely on, lets say, publications dated from 2006: there would be 
no reference point (articles published at different point in time) found such a claim on. To solve this, I applied a 
5-year interval as the point of departure for article inclusion. 
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Chapter 3. Discourse Analysis 
“Through language, we name protagonists, ascribe motivations and provide explanations. 
Through language we construct a narrative” (Hodges 2011: 3/4) 
 
Reading between the lines 
This chapter is the empirical core of my thesis. The six publications chosen as outlined in section 2.2 
are projected here onto the three themes of ‘Enemies of Democracy’, ‘Men of Tribal Origin’ and 
finally ‘Out-of-Context’. Overall, I employed these self-provided criteria categories to judge if, and 
consequently to which degree authors of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence manifest a neo-
Orientalist approach in their writing. Saids’ critiques of a “Western writing and Oriental silence” 
should be kept in mind while we investigate to what extent the terrorism authors, Freilich, Catignani, 
Silber, Frisch Wagemakers and Milton Edwards take after neo-Orientalist academe such as Lewis, 
Kaplan, Crone, Pipes, Huntington (Said 2003: 91). Do these authors alienate the use of terrorist 
tactics? 
 
 Enemies of democracy. 
Freilich (2015): Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? was the first publication I scrutinized 
on a neo-Orientalist practice. It contained a noteworthy fact about his career. Freilich describes 
himself as a political scientist though mentions he served as an officer in the Israeli Defense Forces 
and as a deputy advisor to the Israeli Security Council.52 This made me wonder to what extent a 
former Israeli security specialist is able to represent Palestinian violence in a non-biased manner. 
Freilich’s political position leans towards what I've earlier outlined as a characteristic feature of neo-
Orientalism, i.e. an “unapologetic intellectual investment in and engagement with politics” (Behdad 
& Williams 2012, emphasis added). Disturbingly then, I think that we should consider the influence of 
politically- and ideologically- motivated scholarship on the level of politics. For example, in 
Huntington’s advisory role to the U.S. Department during the Vietnam War, he pressed for a forced 
migration of Vietnamese peasants to the cities because it would weaken the support to the Vietcong. 
His intellectual contribution resulted in the development/use of what we now know as agent orange, 
the chemical used by the U.S. army in its herbal warfare against the terrorist enemy Vietcong 
(Chomsky 1970). 
With knowledge of his background in mind, I continued my analysis of Freilich (2015) and found 
him to be an author who evaluates Israel’s position vis-à-vis terrorist attacks as follows. According to 
Freilich, Israel, can be seen as “a world leader in counter-terrorism and a case study of great 
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 Via: http://polisci.columbia.edu/people/profile/356, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/freilich-chuck, last accessed on April 11, 2016. 
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importance for all nations facing terrorism” (p. 1). In line with this; “the percentage of Israel’s 
population killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy” (p. 3).    
 These remarks reveal Freilich’ ideas about terrorism. His belief that primarily nation-states 
could learn from Israel’s terror experience discloses that Freilich believes that typically democratic 
nation-states face terror threats, rather than (non)political models and actors. Given that Israel 
denies the decree for a Palestinian state, the above understanding of terror seems to befit the neo-
Orientalist sentiment. With the assumption of terror he presents, it appears that Freilich would 
rather attribute terrorist behavior to the ‘stateless’ Arab Palestinian community than those who 
belong to a solid constitutional state like Israel. Moreover, as the image is drawn that until now Jews 
took the hardest punches of anti-Western, anti-democratic terror, a lower profile is given to the fact 
that most terrorist casualties were, and are, actually Muslims, those who are in the overall non-
democratic environments of the Middle-East and Africa. Such disregard makes us wonder what other 
authors have to say about the typical victim/perpetrator role in cases of terrorist attacks.
 Another author whose surname suggests a less objective point of departure with respect to 
the description of Palestinian violence is Efrat Silber. Silber, who used to be a lecturer at the 
Department of Jewish History Ben-Gurion University currently works at the Faculty of Social Sciences 
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, in Israel (p. 89).53 Does she practice neo-Orientalism?  
 Similar to Freilich (2015), Silber’s article Israel's Policy of House Demolitions During the First 
Intifada (2010) deals with the topic of Israeli counterterrorism. However, in contrast to Freilich 
(2015), she discusses that terror-struck countries face ethical and moral dilemmas in their response 
to terror. Silber illustrates that these countries are subjected to a whole set of questions: for e.g. are 
the means to fight terrorism legal (p. 89)? Could these means be on the wrong side of morality (p. 
90)? Are counterterrorism measures actually effective?       
While Silber contemplates these pressing questions she mentions Israel’s tactic of “house sealing 
and demolitions” against “the insurgent Palestinian population” (p. 90).54 According to her, this 
counterterrorist policy was initiated to show and discourage Palestinian (would-be) terrorists that “a 
price would be extracted” for attacking Israeli citizens. Israeli Defense Forces would demolish the 
houses of both living and dead terrorists and/or the homes of relatives involved (p. 90). This 
contrasts with Freilich’s (2015) representation of excessive violence. Silber does not seem to rule out 
Jewish state-led disproportionate violence, .i.e. the capability of Israel to wrongdoings which 
commits illegal activities. Silber underlines the controversiality surrounding this specific reprisal tactic 
i.e. the Israeli bulldozing of Palestinian homes whose residents were inadequately linked to terror 
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 Via https://education.biu.ac.il/en/node/7222, last accessed on June 11, 2016. 
54
 As shown by Silber, this tactic was adopted by the Israeli government until 2005 (p. 90). Yet I myself 
discovered that the tactic is back now: http://forward.com/news/israel/205090/israel-is-again-demolishing-
homes-of-palestinian-t/, last accessed on June 28, 2016. 
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attacks and which led to international condemnation. Moreover, she highlights the ineffectiveness of 
this tactic, and even it’s counter productiveness.  To inflict collateral damage, for example, is shown 
to inspire more hatred among the already frustrated Palestinian community (p. 103).55  
 As neo-Orientalists suppose that terrorism is antithetical to democracy, the approach of 
Wagemakers, a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, to 
Hamas (see section. 2.2) appears to be profoundly different from that of Freilich’. While Freilich 
lumps together the organizations Hamas, Al-Qaeda, The Nursrat Front and Islamic state as “the 
primary sources of terrorism” that Israel currently faces (Freilich 2015: 2), Wagemakers proposes 
that Hamas’ members increasingly refrain from terrorism. In Wagemakers words “there is great 
reason to believe that the way in which Hamas attains its agenda mirrors a “long-term ideological 
moderation” (Wagemakers 2010: 357). Here he sketches a democratically-founded Hamas and 
expresses that their election in 2006 has led to an actual decrease in rocket attacks against Israel. 
Hence, Wagemakers attributes features of self-control and restraint to a group otherwise 
characterized as terrorist (p. 357). He demonstrates that the need for violence decreased once 
Hamas leadership knew it had gained enough legitimacy to continue the path of ceasefire. In 
comparison to Freilich’s detailed outline of the Jewish casualty rate of Hamas’ rocket arsenals, 
Wagemakers, thus, discloses an alternative viewpoint. Correspondingly, the image of Hamas as being 
an ultra-radical, relentless and rigid organization, one that is inflexible in its negotiations with Israel, 
is an assumption abandoned by Wagemakers. He underlines that the view of a Hamas as being a 
terrorist group encompasses an Israeli and Western misperception (p.  359).    
  On the topic of undemocratic terrorism caricature, the author Hillel Frisch also seems 
to lean toward a non- rather than a neo-Orientalist approach. Frisch (2005) tones down their 
sociopolitical shift towards Islamization. For e.g. Palestinian nationalist movements seemingly 
radicalized slogans are portrayed by Frisch as pragmatic and as a “means of cushioning 
fundamentalist blows [from the Global Jihadist discourse] rather than a true change of heart” (403). 
Frisch, thus, seems to lower the otherwise assigned importance of a religious fundamentalist change 
underlying the outlook of Palestinian organizational structures. Moreover, he wonders whether 
these nationalist movements truly, albeit gradually, become more Islamic fundamentalist in essence 
(p. 392/3).           
 Given, Warschitz’ neo-Orientalist postulation that Palestinians (Orientals) “lack the 
'psychological readiness', the cultural qualities that are needed to be members of a democratic 
society” it seems that Frisch proclaims the opposite (Warschitz in Tuastad 2003: 592). Frisch deals 
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with the apparent intensification of Islam oratory among Palestinian politicians in accordance with 
the increased appeal to vote on them through democratic elections. Frisch thus considers a 
combination of Arab/Islam and democracy rather to choose violence as part of the deal to achieve 
what one wants. Moreover, as he reveals that “never in Fatah ideology was Islam construed as the 
normative and legal basis for Palestinian society”, he cannot be accused of proposing that political 
Islam-inspired nationalist movements typically obstruct democracy. 
 
 Men of Tribal Origin. 
Let us now turn to the theme of cultural backwardness which seems to be ascribed to Palestinian 
terrorists. With Freilich’s understanding of a typical Western/democratic victim of terror in mind, it is 
Silber who investigates an opposing viewpoint tends to shed light on the other side of the coin. This 
author stresses that it is through retribution to terror attacks that gives Israel its controversial status. 
Silber e.g. deals with collateral damage, that is damage by Israeli’s to noncombatants arising from 
attacks on Palestinians, and indicates that this shocking method is a topic of debate for democracies 
(other than Israel), the international community, and UN legislation.56 In doing so, Israel is indirectly 
ascribed a propensity for violence because when international disapproval of the demolition of 
housing by Israelis grew, Silber states that Israelis emphasized the military necessity for this 
demolition (p. 94). Thus, where others sketch Israel as a conciliatory, democratic state (Freilich 2015), 
Silber portrays Israel as a country that responds uncompromisingly, disproportionately to terror, yet, 
ironically, renders to wage a long-term justified war against terrorism. In line with this, Silber adds 
the dimension of state-led disproportionate violence against non-combatants. Here, in my opinion, 
Silber gives the impression that Israel might be the inhuman, brutal actor at play, rather than the 
(would-be) Palestinian terrorist with as proposed by Freilich 2015 and which will be shown later, the 
backing of the entire Palestinian population. Silber’s evaluation of terrorism retaliation thus seems to 
takes into account a Jewish entity that is characterized by violent (re)action. From this perspective, 
Silber does not appear to behave according to what has been considered a neo-Orientalist 
perspective on terrorism. 
 Furthermore, Silber in contrast to Freilich, does not appear to seek an obvious dichotomy of 
active Palestinian terror that triggers its passive counterpart, e.g. the Israeli counterterrorism 
response. Rather, Silber problematizes the counterterrorism procedures asking herself: “is a 
government justified in taking any measure to protect its citizens even if these measures contradict 
the moral principles the government claims to uphold?” (p. 90) Also, footnote nr 1. discloses an open 
minded approach to terrorism. Silber refers here to Boas Ganors article Defining Terrorism: One 
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man’s terrorist, another man’s freedomfighter? (p. 101). So to consider this Silbers very first phrase 
“Israel's counter-terrorism policies have often aroused the anger of the Palestinians and the 
international community”, in combination with such a footnote, questions a neutral Jewish position 
to the conflict seems from the beginning (p. 89). Silber certainly does not view Israel as tribalist-
minded Oriental. Then again, emphasized the notion that whereas Israel describes itself as belonging 
to the Occident, her ruthless response to terror is largely debated by Silber.  
The third article analyzed, that of Catignani (2005), seems to overlap with Silber’s (2010) 
article as regards the topic of Israeli counterterrorism. Similar to Silber, Catignani identifies the 
ethical problems that can arise during counterterrorism procedures: “(...) every security operation 
that has been carried out by the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] has had the potential to cause gross 
human rights violations” (p. 258). Yet, in comparison with Silber, Catignani’s view on moral issues 
conveys the impression of a neo-Orientalist practice. The reason behind this relates to Catignani’s 
own proclamation of the controversial Neighbour Practice: “ the use of the wanted man’s neighbor 
as a ‘living shield’ for IDF troops, whereby the neighbour is sent to call on the suspect to come out” 
(p. 257). Despite Catignani’s self-provided criteria that terrorism “(...) owes its idiomatic background 
of successfully implementing fear to entire populations due to its (...) immoral and inhuman nature” 
he refuses to consider this method as terrorist behavior, nor does he underline its inhumane nature. 
E.g. the fact that Israeli use of ‘living shields’ definitely meet Catignani’s own benchmarks of 
terrorism as these hostages are definitely a “choice of target (...) and a moral consideration in itself”, 
an absence of the label terrorism is certainly peculiar here.57 Also, Catignani seems to imply that 
Palestinian adoption of terrorism is unfounded and illogical. This author, after all, states that “it could 
be argued that terrorism is actually not a ‘natural, if unfortunate, result of the fervour and even the 
panic of [Palestinian] people engaged in a desperate struggle” (p. 247, emphasis added). This 
certainly relates to Saids’ critique that neo-Orientalists tend to assume and depict Orientals as people 
who act irrationally. Ultimately, Palestinians who adopt terrorism do show ‘unnatural’ behavior, 
whereas Israel strictly deploys ‘retaliatory military action’. 
Continuing on the neo-Orientalist assumption that rationality is not usual for Orientals, it is 
Milton-Edwards (2014) who, like Wagemakers (2010), seems to argue the opposite. Milton-Edwards 
approaches Hamas as a commonsensical, discreet and prudent movement as follows. Milton-
Edwards demonstrates that Hamas is concerned about the apparent increase in popularity of the so-
called “imported” jihadi ideologues among Gaza-Strip inhabitants (p. 266). In what Hamas leadership 
likes to call the hardline rhetoric of “Al-Qaeda like” groups, their threat to undermine the legitimacy 
of Hamas is discussed by Milton-Edwards (2014). New radical groups accuse Hamas of collaborating 
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with Israel since Hamas occasionally accepts ceasefires and lulls, resulting for Hamas in a loss of 
support from the Palestinian public. Likewise, these Jihadist groups regularly portray Hamas as not 
being Islamic enough, or betraying the “greater cause”. This weakens the position of Hamas, the 
party that hitherto rules in Palestine (p. 263, 268).       
 Milton-Edwards clearly diverges from the viewpoint that Orientals are uncultivated, irrational 
and unreasonable actors. In this way, she portrays a Hamas that is very cautious of whether it should 
replace its self-proclaimed ‘moderate’ attitude with an unyielding radical Islamist one, in order to 
regain support. This reveals Milton-Edwards’ broadminded approach to the complexity of the conflict. 
Her differentiation of a moderate and radical Islam, a distinction “largely ignored in the West”, tells 
us that she does not tend to reproduce the terrorist stigma to which Hamas is largely ascribed to by 
the West (p. 260).58 Milton-Edwards belief that Hamas strategically rather than limitlessly employs 
violence contrasts with the popular assumption that Hamas resembles a “radical, violent, and 
terrorist group incapable of transforming itself into a moderate political movement” (p. 260). In this 
way, she puts a human face on the Hamas party. According to her, Hamas simply tries to survive in 
the political arena and to remain the chief, democratic elected party that represents the Palestinian 
cause.  
These beliefs about Hamas are also true for Wagemakers (2010). This author also expresses that 
he perceives that Hamas acting pragmatically and flexibly. Relating to Milton-Edwards’ description of 
a Hamas that conveys opportunistic behavior, Wagemakers proposes a continuously varying rhetoric 
fostered by a flexible Hamas.59 Seen in this light, it is interesting to witness the approaches to Hamas, 
a movement designated by “Israel (and the West)” as terrorists, by means of the Social Movement 
Theory (SMT). This theory, treats organizations as “rational, flexible and susceptible to changing 
political circumstances”, a treatment I have not seen applied by neo-Orientalists in their approach to 
terrorism (p. 358/369). For e.g. Wagemakers analyses Hamas’ along the lines of the SMT, he does not 
only link the concept of rationality to the Oriental figure, but to a movement often accused of being 
barbaric in nature. Wagemakers’ scientific prism thus seems to contrast with neo-Orientalism. He 
sheds light on Hamas’ viewpoint and contends that its actions are based on reason and 
commonsense, for e.g. he states that Hamas’ “choice between extreme language and losing 
credibility in the eyes of the [Palestinian] people is perhaps easily made” (p. 373). 
Interestingly, the way in which Wagemakers (2010) perceives victims and perpetrators roles in 
the Palestinian-Israel conflict is clearly different from that of other authors. For e.g. where 
Wagemakers states: “As the uprising and Israel’s military action progressed, so too did Hamas’ 
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willingness to strike, increasing its use of terrorism (p. 359), Freilich, however, states that “Israel’s 
tough response to the Second Intifada turned Palestinian public opinion at least partially against 
violence, not in principle, but because of the heavy costs it incurred“(Freilich 2015: 11, emphasis 
added). Neo-Orientalists such as Alroy claim that “Arabs are a fiercely vengeful people” and thus 
typically underline an inborn “Muslim rage” as the principal motivation for conflict. Freilich seems to 
echo such a line of attack as he states that Palestinians only refrain from violence when economic 
costs become too immense (Lewis in Tuastad 2003: 592).60 Moreover, the image that every 
revengeful Palestinian lines him/herself behind violence and that Israel virtuously reacts to such 
actions, contrasts with the notion put forward by Wagemakers. This author proposes that terrorism 
was mainly adopted as a last resort once Palestinian resistance met with disproportionate brutal 
repercussions. Each author thus deals with this dilemma in a different way. 
 Out-of-Context. 
As we now turn to the findings that relate to neo-Orientalism’s generalized, dualist West/Islam 
approach to the conflict in the Orient, we should take into account the following:  
 
“ (...) the micro-histories of many of today's conflicts become hidden. Complex local 
variations, motives, histories and interrelationships are consistently played down in favour of 
meta-narratives and grand interpretations. Each conflict is seen through whatever 
classificatory lens has been recently adopted to aggregate violence in the outside world” 
(Bhatia 2005: 16). 
 
Considering Bhatia’s statement above, it appears that Freilich (2015) utilizes such a 
classificatory lens. He appears to place the Palestinian-Israeli conflict within the realm of the Global 
War on Terror narrative arguing that: (...) Israel became a part of the terrorist war, at least 
psychologically, with an emotional impact that has yet to fully dissipate” (p. 5). Along these lines, it 
can be said that a neo-Orientalist perspective unveils itself and several reasons uphold why.   
Firstly, the many offenders, not merely Palestinian perpetrators but also Egyptian, Syrian, 
Lebanese and even Jewish, which Israel had to confront in earlier times are consolidated into a 
unified whole known as the Palestinian terrorist. 
Secondly Freilich aligns, or reduces, the many causes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to one 
single cause. Israel is described by Freilich as being part of ‘the West’, and encounters his uncivilized 
counterpart, the Palestinian savage. Specifically, since Freilich portrays the conflict being part of a 
greater, international confrontation between democracy and terrorism, between the good and the 
bad, between freedom and tyranny, a Huntingtonian meta-narrative of us, the West versus ‘the rest’ 
(Islam) seems promoted. 
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Thirdly, complicated, multifaceted and a lasting seventy year old conflict between Jews and 
the Arab-Palestinian community gets conflated with a war on terror that was elicited relatively 
recently by the (9/11) attack. In this way a great deal of historical and neo-imperialist influences into 
the region are ignored. Ignoring important historical events in this way is characteristic for neo-
Orientalists (Tuastad 2003: 591).  
Hence, notwithstanding that Freilich refers to two fundamentally different worldviews, that 
of resistance and terrorism, he disregards the fact that Palestinian resistance also has to do with 
Israel’s cruel “preventive detention” and abuse of human rights regarding Arab Palestinian citizens. 
This can also be said for neo-Orientalist Lewis (Said 2003: 318). It appears that Freilich’s association 
with the “War on terror” narrative and the Israel-Palestinian conflict turns the latter into a symbolic 
clash of moral universes (Hodges 2010). This dissemination tends to isolate Palestinian terrorism as 
opposing global order, freedom and democracy. 
Such an apparently biased view of Palestinian terror, ties into the article of Catignani (2005) 
which reveals an one-sided approach to (Palestinian) terrorism. Although, in contrast to Freilich, this 
author seems to report a difference between a so-called global savage and a Palestinian savage, 
“Israel has had a long tradition of fighting international and Palestinian terrorism” (p. 245, emphasis 
added), his constant use of the contraction “Palestinian terror(ism)” points to an Orientalizing of the 
term.61 Also, the way that he sanctions that Israel has seems to be left with no other option but to 
intermittently violate Palestinian human rights, strikes me as neo-Orientalist: “(...). The number of 
[Israeli] violations pales in comparison with the number of violations Palestinian terrorist groups 
have deliberately carried out against Israeli civilians” (p. 258). However, this, does not mean that 
Israel cannot be held responsible for its (terrorist) atrocities.     
Although Freilich and Catignani seem to approach the label of terrorist in a manner which 
neglects the most important facts about the conflict, Milton-Edwards (2014) and Frisch (2005), 
contrastingly, clearly outlined the complete picture. For e.g., with respect to Saids’ condemnation of 
Orientalists speaking on behalf of Others, it is important to state that Milton-Edwards approached 
Hamas’ political turmoil from the ‘inside’. She interviewed Hamas leadership (emic approach in 
anthropology) and so gave Hamas leaders the opportunity to represent themselves.62 In this way, she 
avoided creating a simplified version of reality. For example, the belief of many that Hamas’ group 
ethics relies upon terrorism, is refuted by the implementation of Hamas’s own announcements that 
is unwilling to align itself to a hardline Jihadist rhetoric characterized by endless violence (p. 263). In 
addition, concerning the Western perception that Hamas is no different than Jihadist groups like Al-
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Qaeda, Hamas angles herself from the otherwise depicted Other view stating “We in Hamas: our 
battle is on the Palestinian land”, and we, Hamas (...) together with many other major Islamist 
leaders also signed a declaration condemning the 9/11 attacks as against all human and Islamic 
norms” (p. 262).         
 Similar to Milton-Edwards, Frisch also does not represent an unambiguous Muslim-terrorist 
caricature. For e.g.: Said Ibrahim Said Ramadan, whom Frisch portrays as the Oriental perpetrator 
behind a shooting attack in Jerusalem killing two and wounding thirty (p. 400), for instance, is 
presented with a Jewish/Occidental counterpart. Baruch Goldstein, an American-born Israeli 
physician murdered twenty-nine Arab parishioners (p. 394). Here Frisch labels both sides of the 
conflict as being capable of breeding terrorist behavior.  
Besides, it seems that Frisch simply drops the use of the whole label of terrorism as the term 
‘terrorism’ appears to be used just once in here entire article (p. 403). Therefore she appears not to 
follow the dichotomy of the Palestinian-terrorist versus Israeli-counterterrorist adopted by Freilich 
(2015) and Catignani (2010). 
 
3.4) Overall Verdicts 
 
I. Freilich (2015) 
As regards a judgment on neo-Orientalism, Freilichs’ statement that where terrorism is permitted by 
the Palestinians hurting the Israeli’s, appears to advocate a mere Palestinian violent Other view. 
Considering Freilich’s central question of the efficacy of Israeli counter-terrorism policies,’ one should 
bear in mind what effective Jewish counter-terrorism actually means when it is represented with its 
alleged trigger of Palestinian terrorism. Moreover, as this dichotomy (Palestinian-terrorism/Israeli-
counterterrorism) is cherished without any indications to an academic debate concerning 
‘weaknesses’ of using the term terrorism, one must doubt if Freilich even considered the importance 
to refer to the debate. Freilich seems to focus on Israeli security while paying little attention to 
Palestinian experiences, also neglecting their security matters.63  
By stating that “The primary sources of terrorism Israel has faced (...)” predominantly covers 
Palestinian nationalist viciousness, I argue that the terrorism-expert Freilich resonates a high neo-
Orientalist point of departure (p. 2). 
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II. Silber (2010) 
Apart from Silber’s article presented here, I recognized no use of the word terrorism in this author’s 
other publications.64 This in itself makes it seem inadequate to criticize her on a neo-Orientalist 
approach to terrorism. However, seeing that she considers the usual victims of terror as being 
“(Western) democratic countries that face terrorist threats at home or abroad” (p. 89), she 
apparently discloses a narrow-minded view that has the earmarks of a neo-Orientalist perception of 
terror.65          
Besides, it appears that Silber aligns herself with neo-Orientalism sentiment, albeit not 
specifically with the terrorist Other. Silber’s explanation that Israeli counterterrorism has an even 
more devastating impact on Palestinians, as houses are extremely important in Arab culture, a 
relativism is hereby stimulated where they [Arabs] respond differently to punishment than us [non-
Arabs].66 Thus, taking into account that the neo-Orientalist approach Silber appears to nurture when 
relying on the antagonism democracy versus global terrorism, yet tries to understand how 
disproportionate violence is perceived by the Palestinian side, I evaluate her publication as mediocre 
neo-Orientalist. 
 
III. Catignani (2005) 
According to Catignani, terrorism equals “(...) premeditated, politically-motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents“(p. 
246, emphasis added).67 Catignani hereby puts forward the possibility that when state-actors, like 
counterterrorism officials, punish terror they, actually may foster uncivilized, indiscriminate violence 
against innocent citizens.  
However, I argue that Catignani still seems to endorse a civilized us/ unreasonable them 
rhetoric. He expresses sympathy for states like Israel that tend to depoliticize terrorism while an 
emphasis is put on its criminal essence. The statement “(...) many states since 11 September have 
adopted a policy of controlling terrorism by downplaying its political character and emphasizing its 
criminality”, is for example followed by (...) Such a position is understandable, because it could be 
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argued that terrorism is actually not a ‘natural, if unfortunate, result of the fervour and even the 
panic of [Palestinian] people engaged in a desperate struggle”(p. 247).68 
Catignani also rephrased Lacquer’s “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” 
into “one man’s terrorist is [simply] another man’s terrorist”. In this way, he seems to analyze and 
rely on preconceptions regarding the label terrorist. The idea that what seems like terrorism should 
be represented as terrorism is however, utterly unconvincing. Besides, since Catignani served as a 
counter-insurgency advisor in the U.S. army,69 his “unapologetic” intellectual investment in U.S. 
foreign policy, concentrating on the Middle-East seems clear. Since I scrutinize whether the terrorism 
discipline reproduces a neo-Orientalist discourse in which political affiliation of intellectuals mirrors 
commonality, I regard Catignani (2015) as highly neo-Orientalist. 
 
IV. Milton-Edward (2014) 
Milton-Edwards examined the phenomenon of Islamization with respect to the Palestinian socio-
political agenda. This author implies that so-called “new radical groups” like Al-Qai’da seem to appeal 
to Palestinians. This indicates a public shift from a moderate stance, which Hamas, the party placed 
at the center of this article seems to attain, to a more radical, hardline Islamist position.70 This 
suggests that the main question of Milton-Edwards is as follows: will Hamas, seen by some as not 
Islamic enough, endure as the main representative of the Palestinian cause (Milton-Edwards 2014: 
265)?             
 It may be that Saids’ plea for a self-representing ‘East’ has been heard by Milton-Edwards. By 
deciphering Hamas’ outlook with interviews and consequently presenting them in a research paper, 
Milton-Edwards (2014) clearly contrasts with neo-Orientalist academe who simply assume that 
radical violent behavior is typical for Orientals without questioning the underling motives. In addition, 
the other side of the Hamas spectrum, the civilian perceived situation of Hamas, is also sketched in 
interviews.71 Milton-Edwards use of extensive qualitative data in the form of interviews with Gaza-
inhabitants and Hamas leadership, differs from a prejudiced scientific neo-Orientalist description of 
violence that is typically assessed in one way and assumed to be distinct for local cultures. In line 
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with this, where Catagnani and Freilich connote PLO hijackings with the rise of absolutist, unyielding 
terrorism, Milton-Edwards reports that the turbulent hostage-taking period of the 1970s became the 
main arena of Palestinian secular nationalists, rather than terrorists, to extract concessions (p. 264). 
Taking these points into account I identify Milton-Edwards (2014) as a weak neo-Orientalist.  
 
V. Wagemakers (2010) 
Similarly, Wagemakers (2010) reveals that the label terrorist is not solely applied to Palestinians. For 
e.g. one of Hamas’ leaders, is cited stating that Israel had used ‘‘its terrorist practices against the 
Palestinian people’’ (p. 362). Hamas, likewise, is cited as follows: ‘‘the criminal aggressor [Israel] only 
understands the language of force, repression, terrorism and the desecration of holy places’’ (p. 363, 
375, emphasis added). In line with this, even the concept of “framing” is elaborated upon in 
Wagemakers’ paragraph Framing the Fight Against Israel (p. 360). Related to the sketch of terrorist 
with a characteristic tribalist attitude, Wagemakers seems to ascribe a non-Oriental barbarousness. 
He, namely, mentions the Sabra and Shatila 1982 massacre where Christian Lebanese right-wing 
party Phalange, allies of the Israeli Defense Forces, slaughtered approximately 3500 Palestinians who 
took refuge in Beirut, Lebanon (p. 362). To sum up, it appears that Wagemakers believes that 
stigmatization of both Palestinians and Jews occurs. Therefore, as I appraise Wagemakers’ broad-
minded understanding of the demonization processes linked to terror, I evaluate his article as weakly 
neo-Orientalist.  
  
VI. Frisch (2005)  
It seems as if Frisch’s study on Islamist contestations in the Palestinian political arena is performed 
with an open mind. Where other authors repeatedly attach the dimension of Palestinian violence to 
words such as ‘terror, terrorist attack or, in concept form, terrorism’, Frisch refrains from this. 
Instead of a predominant presence of the term terrorism in Frisch’s (2005) work, we can distinguish 
the use of descriptions such as; “a round of violence” (p. 392), a “confrontation”, an “attack” (p. 
401), a “military announcement” (p. 401), a “Palestinian guerilla action” (p. 399), or the work of 
“irregulars”. Where Frisch, however, does reflect a neo-Orientalist view is that she considers the 
Palestinian-Israel conflict demarcating “a civilizational fault line between Jewish Zionism and Islam” 
(p. 391), a statement that agrees with a Huntingtonian clash-of-civilizations. However, Frisch, in my 
opinion still acts less neo-Orientalistly than some of the other authors discussed. A Palestinian claim 
to self-determination, for instance, is not embodied along the lines of neo-Orientalist featured 
language converting political resistance from Palestinians (Intifadas) into exclusively terrorist 
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behavior. “No”, the Palestinians’ decree, according to Frisch, “does carry political weight.”72 
Although Frisch does expound upon a civilizational clash idea, she measures violence in the conflict 
without using the term terrorism and therefore I evaluate her article as mediocre neo-Orientalist. 
 
Chapter 4. Voyeuristic Terrorism-experts 
 
4.1) Conclusion 
 
“The term “terrorism” is a stigmatizing concept; as a result, definers, labelers, and the 
labeled are eager selectively to exclude themselves and their own actions under the term 
and, correspondingly, to include others and their actions under it; the result is that terrorism” 
is a politically contested concept” (Smelser & Mitchell 2002: 13). 
 
Considering the statement above, it is crucial to take another look at the background of the authors 
of publications in this area. The main research question of this thesis therefore involved determining 
the extent to which a neo-Orientalist framing of ‘Palestinian terrorists’ occurs in the journal 
Terrorism and Political Violence. This question was divided into three subquestions. Firstly it was 
established what neo-Orientalist framing is. Secondly the questioning pertaining to what makes the 
Israel-Palestine conflict a favored background of a neo-Orientalist description of an ongoing struggle 
between the West and the Rest, typically Islam?”. The last sub question investigated the way neo-
Orientalism discloses itself in relation to the framing of Palestinian terrorists in the journal Terrorism 
and Political Violence. 
The first sub question was answered in the chapter on theoretical framework (Chapter 1.2). I 
demonstrated that the phenomenom of neo-Orientalism is in line with classical Orientalism, the term 
Said used to define a discipline which promotes the West/Islam dualism and the perception that 
Orientals are less human (Samiei 2010: 1145). I concentrated on Saids’ argument that imperial civil 
servants, i.e. the entire Western society, bases their claims of ‘differences by nature’ to mean 
differences in knowledge between the Franco-British colonizer and the colonized, the Orientals. The 
critical point here is that Western studies of Islam created widely-believed dogmas where self-
control, rationality, development, humanity and superiority became terms that could be attributed 
to the Judeo-Christian West, while inferiority, irrationality, lack of reasoning, depotism, fierceness, 
barbarianism connoted everything that had to do with ‘the East’. This image in turn helped to 
legitimize and naturalize Western effort to civilize, or actually, to dominate and exploit the Orient 
(Said 2003). 
                                                          
72
 “Palestinians form the majority of the inhabitants of the West Bankand Gaza, and that their claim from this 
perspective had been recognized by the UN in the past, does carry political weight” (p. 403, emphasis added). 
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 I then demonstrated that many scholars contend that the project of Orientalism never 
ended but instead is revitalized in the form of neo-Orientalism in accordance with Bush’s global “war 
against terrorism” rhetoric.73 Like earlier colonial times, the perception is given that the civilized 
West encounters its savage counterpart inIslamic terrorists who are systematically rendered as 
“crazy madmen” (Ringmar 2013: 276, Esposito in Malik 2002: 15/23).74 The widely-held view is that 
with War against Terror as its current context, neo-Orientalism entails a mode of (mis)representation 
that embraces Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations idea. The war against the contemporary “savage” 
influenced by an anti-Islam intellectual, mirrors the position of early social sciences in traditional 
Orientalism. Although Orientalists of today do not ascribe splendor, romanticism and sensuality to 
terrorists, to provide a ‘truth’ underlying their Otherness is a reminiscant feature of Orientalism. To 
portray violent behavior as distinct for Arabs, for example, remains a discursive investment of the 
dichotomy civilized West/ uncivilized Muslim world.       
 The dualist worldview of civilization/terrorism upheld by neo-Orientalist thought ties into the 
methodological case part (Chapter 2.1 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict) where I answered the second 
sub question: “what makes the Israel-Palestine conflict a favored background of a neo-Orientalist 
description of an ongoing struggle between the West and the Rest, typically Islam?”. Here I 
introduced Israel’s war on terror as the scenario that is picked up by neo-Orientalists and which 
supports the image of a Palestinian is that of a “barbaric Other”, while that of Israel is as the heroic 
defender of civilized principles (Zulaika 2003: 198). Interestingly, I outlined how intellectuals feed the 
assumption of Israels role of the innocent victim, while violent political events instigated by 
Palestinians are downplayed to criminality and terrorism, which they believe is behavior always 
distinct for them, not us (Lowrie in Malik 2002:249/252, Chuckman in Esposito in Malik 2002: 259, 
Malik 2002: 267). I argued that such a distortion of reality, turning highly complex conflict into a clash 
between “symbolic-moral universes” in fact entails concealed violence against peripheralized people, 
in this case Palestians (Ben-Yehuda 2005: 50).   
In Chapter 3. Discourse Analysis, I presented the ways in which Palestinian violence is 
outlined neo-Orientistically in the academic magazine Terrorism and Political Violence. This deals 
with the third sub question. In brief, a “blame it on Islam” explanation for terrorism was not found. 
                                                          
73
 I prefer the word revitalized rather than rebirth because many contend that Western misrepresentation of 
the Rest never died’, it continued in time symbolized in, for example; the ban on the niqab and hijab and the 
simultaneous invention of ‘saving’ Muslim women; differential treatment of diaspora Muslims in most Western 
societies (bearded brown men or ‘British Muslims’ as suspect categories, for example) (Amin-Khan 2012: 1596, 
Behdad & Williams). 
74
 Futhermore, awfully reminiscant of the systematic effort by 18th and 19th century colonial powers to civilize 
the barbaric Rest are, according to many, the present ‘civilizing missions’ in Afghanistan and Iraq (Amin-Khan 
2012: 1597). 
 
36 
 
However, as shown in the Discourse Analysis, there is reason to believe that terrorist representers in 
the journal do practice neo-Orientalism. Insinuations that Palestinian violence ‘normally’ precedes an 
Israeli counterterrorism measures were, for example, unveiled in Catignani (2005) and Freilich (2015). 
This makes it difficult to rule out neo-Orientalism because the image drawn is one of the hostile and 
characteristically aggressive Other. In addition, the term terrorism seems rarely, if ever ascribed to 
the Occident/Israel, while authors, to a varying degree, present the idea of Palestinian terrorism 
without reluctance. This problematizes the term terrorism. Also, some terrorist representers seem to 
indirectly sketch a Palestinian violent Other by delineating its opposite, that is the Israeli peace-
aspiring democracy. For example, Freilich puts emphasis on the ‘fact’ that Israel, “sought to isolate 
the peace process from terrorism” while Palestinian suicide terror attacks “(...) grew bloodier as the 
peace process carried on” (Freilich 2015: 4). Also Catignani states that while Israel “disassociated the 
peace process from reactions to terrorist attacks against Israel”, “(...) mass-murder attacks in Israel” 
instigated by “Arab terror” increased (Catignani 2005: 254). 
The findings indicate in this thesis suggest that two authors, namely Milton-Edwards 2014, 
and Wagemakers 2010 out of six seem to disregard neo-Orientalist practice. However, considering 
Saids’ view that all scholarship regarding the Orient(al) is Orientalism, they still can beconsidered 
weak neo-Orientalists (Said 2003: 50-52). Particularly since both authors review Palestinian/Oriental 
violence in a journal named Terrorism and Political Violence, they indirectly link terrorism with the 
Middle-East which reflects neo-Orientalism.    
Author & Publication Year 
Original 
category 
Verdicts 
I. Freilich 2015 PT high neo-Orientalist 
II. Silber 2010 PT mediocre neo-Orientalist 
III. Catagnani 2005 PT high neo-Orientalist 
IV. Milton-Edwards 2014 BN weak neo-Orientalist 
V. Wagemakers 2010 BN weak neo-Orientalist 
VI. Frisch 2005 BN mediocre neo-Orientalist 
 
Where does the finding that six authors, practice neo-Orientalism leave us in answering the main 
question: “to what extent does a neo-Orientalist framing of ‘Palestinian terrorists’ occur in the 
journal Terrorism and Political Violence?”. Having identified six neo-Orientalists makes it difficult to 
determine to what extent the journal on the whole facilitates neo-Orientalism. However, I argue that 
37 
 
neo-Orientalism is prominent in this journal. For example, refering to Saids’ critiques of “Western 
writing, Oriental silence”, I identified that in the journal a large proportion of terrorism representers 
share a Jewish background while not a single Palestinian terrorism-expert was identified (Said 2003: 
96).75 Therefore the journal seems dominated by experts who are perhaps most distanced from the 
subjects they describe. Also, showed in Chapter 2. Quantitative Preliminary Analysis it is obvious that 
the proportion of articles focusing on Palestinian terrorism clearly outweighs that focusing on Jewish 
terrorism. In that sense, terrorism representers of Terrorism and Political Violence refer to Orientals 
as the usual subject, or perhaps more appropriately, suspect.     
 Taking the aforementioned in account and considering that this journal is regarded as one of 
the three core journals in the area of terrorism research, we may assume that the tone set forth by 
terrorism specialists in this journal is echoed by many others (Stampnitzky 2013: 15/16).76 Therefore, 
the field of ‘terrorism studies’ might produce a neo-Orientalist discourse. This then, proposes a need 
to reconsider the use of the term ‘terrorism’. We, for instance, have to remind ourselves that an 
apparent lack of definition of the term terrorism is problematical as regards what entities are able to 
produce and distribute refering to to the label terrorist. The vagueness of the word terrorist appears 
to empower these institutitions that are most capable of distributing information about terorrists, 
i.e.: governments. To illustrate this point: 
“Given that the designation of terrorism is ambiguous, contested, and relatively new (…) the 
rules for typifying political violence are likely still emergent. Thus, the expert categorizers (in 
this case, the government) could have a large degree of leeway in their decision-making” 
(Beck & Miner 2013: 842). 
In view of this, I dedicate the last section of this thesis to the academic debate concerning 
disagreement about the definition of ‘terrorism’. The statement that ‘terrorism’ is an “essentially 
contested concept” will be discussed taking in to account the issue that terrorism research is often 
funded by governments (Chapter 4.1) (Conolly [1993] in Schmidt 2004: 400, Sageman 2014: 576). In 
addition, I will reflect upon what has been said about the relationship between illusory meaning of 
the term terrorism and the post-9/11 GWOT narrative (Chapter 4.2).77  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 To name some Israeli academics in the journal whom write about Palestinian violence: Menachem Klein 
(1996), Raphael Israeli (1997, 2000), Hillel Cohen (2005), Ariel Merari, Jonathan Fighel, Boaz Ganor, Ephraim 
Lavie, Yohanan Tzoreff, & Arie Livne (2009). 
76
 Next to the journals Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Stampnitzky 2013: 
15/16). 
77
 GWOT: Global War on Terror post-9/11 narrative: See Chapter 1.2. 
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4.2) A (scientific) definition of terrorism? 
 
“ (...) research is only able to be reproduced, compared against, and generally useful to the 
wider literature if other scholars have a clear understanding of measurement criteria—and 
perhaps more so if the criteria are commonly accepted” (Phillips 2015: 226). 
 
The above statement outlines the importance of a clear, universally accepetable defintion of 
terrorism. What exactly constitutes terrorism? Many authors demonstrate that this became a 
general question in the wake of 9/11. These horrendous attacks urged us to understand why people 
turn to political violence and what terrorist organizations such as 9/11’s perpetrators, Al-Qaeda, 
actually entail and stand for (Phillips 2014: 225, Sageman 2014: 566).  
At the same time, it is argued that from the beginning of scholar research on terrorism, just 
over fourty years ago that scholars can merely speculate about terorrism. The lack of communication 
between the academic and intelligence communities as well as govermental refusal to share primary 
sources of data concerning terrorism, has led to much confusion about this concept (Crenshaw 2014: 
556, Sageman 2014: 565/566). Academics are mesmerized with the question of what a definition of 
terror should include and similarly about what not to include (Cooper 2001: 882). Some aim at a 
concept without definition, arguing that terrorism is analogous to pornography in that “one knows it 
when one sees it” (Phillips 2015: 229). Also, the inclusive definition, i.e. that “a terrorist group is any 
group that uses terrorism”, is in agreement with the counter argument that “terrorism might only be 
a tactic, a strategy - and therefore no group is inherently a terrorist group” (Weinberg [1991] in 
Phillips 2015: 230). However, the so-called exclusive definition that terrorist groups resemble 
“subnational political organizations that use terrorism”78  and usually operate ‘underground’ as they 
do not hold terrain, is also to be questioned (Phillips 2015: 231). For example, the Islamic State (IS) 
(still) occupies large chunks of the Middle-East and yet this group is regularly refered to as terrorist.79  
Furthermore along with varying definitions, samples examined by academe in their effort to 
draw inferences also differ. One such sample is the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which, 
according to Phillips, is a highly non-representative list to test theories about terrorism with at least 
three aims. Firstly, to be considered terrorist, a group must be alien to the U.S. This instantly 
excludes all American terrorist networks. Secondly, listed groups must ‘‘threaten the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security’’. Foreign organizations focused on domestic issues are thus not 
included. Thirdly, with the former point in mind, it is likely that otherwise ‘‘qualified’’ groups - “those 
that are not very powerful or that are so new that the State Department has not yet completed the 
                                                          
78
 Note that this definition has three elements: a) groups must be subnational,b) groups must be political, and, 
c) groups must use terrorism (Phillips 2015: 231). 
79
 My point about IS self-declared kaliphate ties into Phillips who argues “If terrorist groups must be 
subnational, what degree of connection to a state removes them from this category?” (Phillips 2015: 238). 
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process of deciding to list the group”, are also excluded from the FTO-list (Phillips 2015: 235). 
Accordingly, Phillips show that when terrorist experts infer their conclusions based on a non-random 
list such as the politically-reasoned FTO list, misleading inferences are likely to be drawn (Phillips 
2015: 226). Phillips himself, for instance, states: “Abrahms, using the FTO-list, finds terrorism to be 
ineffective, while Pape, using a different sample, finds suicide terrorism to be effective” (Krause 
[2013] in Phillips 2014: 236). 
For all the reasons outlined above, it may seem futile to define ‘terrorism’. This is because (a) 
the concept,, and research on it, are social constructions, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedomfighter”, and, as Jenkins illustrates, (b) the subject of the terrorist, does not equal a fixed 
identity (Turk 2004: 271).  
 
“I don’t believe terrorists belong to a separate country of the world called ‘terrorism’, and 
therefore we can deal with them apart from various local struggles. Their actions take place 
within a political context. In some cases their actions result from injustices that are 
understandable. In some cases not” (Jenkins [1974] in Stampnitzky 2013: 73). 
   
Therefore conceptual differences between analysts ideas of a what terrorist groups are and to the 
lack of discussion hereof, are critical to consider (Phillips 2015: 226). By relying on secondary sources 
(journalistic inquiry,80 “erroneous claims by self-appointed experts and leaks from governmental 
officials often made with political intentions”),81 terrorist-experts risk contributing to an ultimately 
less useful body of research. Also, the problem of research with the built-in moral evaluation, that 
terrorism is legitimate violence, towards its subjects, emerges (Sageman 2014: 570, Stampnitzky 
2013: 51). This point is supported below: 
 
“(...) attempts to rush to disciplinary generalizations without examining the moral dimension 
may yield only different historical sequences, or it may strip the events from their social or 
moral context and end up with a characterization that is so general and meaningless that it 
may position the concept of ‘terror’ on the verge of being virtually useless” (Ben-Yehuda 
2005: 48/49). 
 
                                                          
80
 Sageman’s (2014) critique on the dramatic increase in U.S government funding terrorism after 9/11 relates 
here. Eg Sagaman highlights how “self-appointed” experts gained publicity from the sudden money surge. The 
field of terrorism, in Sageman’s words, became dominated by “laymen” who “controlled funding, prioritized it 
according to their own questions, and conducted their own ‘‘research”. And: “these experts’ still fill the 
airwaves and freely give their opinions to journalists, thereby framing terrorist events for the public“ (Sageman 
2014: 566). 
81
 Bhatia illustrates the problematical nature: “The interaction between political interest and the naming of 
armed actors, combined with the fact that states tend to overlook the brutal acts of their allies, limits the 
degree to which governments can be relied on to represent opponents accurately and impartially” (Bhatia 2005: 
16). 
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4.3) Demystifying terrorism 
 
 “(…) a core groups of terrorism-experts is dominant, and that it is able to subjagate and exclude 
other sorts of knowledges, thus maintaining control over the terrorism discourse, which, in turn, 
legitimizes state power” (Jackson 2012 in Stampnitzky 2013: 201).  
 
The above statement, is supported by Saids’ critique of Orientalism’s hierarchical knowledge-power 
structure. The current expert/terrorist relationship, namely, seems to take after the 
Orientalist/Oriental relationship, as the former ‘creates’ rational knowledge about the irrational 
latter. Regardless of the extent to which terrorism-experts foster neo-Orientalism, the problem is 
that they are likely driven by subjective, arbitrary political influences that are invisible to themselves 
and the reader. Besides, as shown reporting that some tragedies are terrorist attacks and their 
perpetrators terrorists, is morally and culturally bound and therefore repugnant (Bhatia 2005: 16, 
Ben Yehuda 2005: 33, Stampnitzky 2013).  
This relates to the main research question “to what extent does a neo-Orientalist framing of 
‘Palestinian terrorists’ occur in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence?” and the answer seems 
to be to a disturbingly large extent. For e.g. we should remind ourselves that ‘(Palestinian) terror’, 
and (Occidental) research on this, both equal cultural systems, i.e. social constructs desperately in 
need of reconsideration (Crenshaw 2014: 556, Sluka 2000: 12, Turk 2004: 271). A practical example 
of this is as follows. Catignani (2005) writes: “When it comes to terrorism there should be no room 
for moral relativism” (p. 256). However, I believe that; to quote MacIntyre; “there is no morality as 
such; morality is always the morality of a particular community” (1984: 8). 
Where does this leave terrorism-experts? Signifying the new “namegivers” regarding current 
Others, like former Orientalists, they tend to provide the ‘facts’ about those whose actions we 
witness on prime time television (Bhatia 2005: 9).82 To posses knowledge about terrorism, in 
accordance with Saids’ regarding the Orient, is, in this sense, “to dominate it, to have authority over 
it” (Said 2003: 32). The following statement illustrates how the knowledge/power (over) dichotomy is 
supported within terrorism research:  “Analysis of ‘terrorism’ and the war on terror have tended to 
assume that experts possess, and wield, a significant amount of power” (Stampnitzky 2013: 201). 
By way of an anthropological relativizing of Palestinian terrorism, my thesis acts as an critical 
reminder of that experts have and wield a great ammount of power. Scientific naming of terrorists 
entails, in what Said might have called, “a political vision of reality” (Said 2003: 43). In line with this, I 
recommend that we contemplate as to why some movements, such as Hamas, are listed as terrorists 
                                                          
82
 In Bhatia’s words namegivers encompass “those who hold linguistic power” (Bhatia 2005: 9).  
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while others are not (Ben-Yehuda 2005: 39).83 This is of particular importance since there can be real-
world effects attached to this labeling. It is violence we commit to these things and naming has an 
infectious effect as follows: 
 
“Once an act or an attack is classified as criminal or terrorist in nature, the term has a habit 
of then being used to describe both the group itself and then all the acts which that group 
engages in, even when they attack military targets”(Bhatia 2005: 15).    
 
In other words, the label terrorist sticks. To instantly denounce Others, such as Palestinian 
movements, as terrorists rules out the scenario that one is actually fighting for a legitimate goal. 
With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an intellectual-cemented label of the Palestinian 
terrorist supposses that we have to remain critical of the Palestinian terrorist stigma. What does the 
massive literature on antistate terrorism mean while the topic of state terror, for example from Israel, 
seems to have been neglected by scholars? For example, can state-led reprisals against terror be 
labeled terrorism (Sluka 2000: 1, Malik 2002: 272)?84  
Correspondingly, the fact that the US labeled seven countries as “terrorist states”, five of which 
were Muslim (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan) needs to be questioned more in the academic sphere 
as this suggests a neo-Orientalist perception of terrorism (Tuastad 2003: 593). Moreover, with regard 
to a neo-Orientalist dimension of terrorism the following point is definitely worth considering: “(…) if 
a westerner kills his fellow civilians, he is a “crazy-loner”; if an Oriental kills his fellow civilians, he is 
the good old terrorist; and if the same Oriental kills western civilians, he is the ‘new’ terrorist” 
(Kumar 2012: 234). This relates to the complications involved with a definitional approach regarding 
the term terrorism. Beck & Miner (2013) also indicate that Islamic organizations are more likely to be 
designated terrorists by the US than other parties with a similar approach.85 
In summary, a lack of internal criticism, non-positioning (not reflectively mentioning an agent-
subject bias) in terrorism research, needs to be given more attention. Disturbingly, terrorism 
research appears to be in a poor state as reported by Sageman : the last decades, involves “a system 
of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while 
academics understand everything but know nothing” (Sageman 2014: 576). 
                                                          
83
 Phillips points at the questionable terrorist label the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK): as they still appear on the 
U.S. List of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and the European Council list of Terrorist Organisations while 
receivingAmerican help in the amed fight against Islamic State (DAESH). Via: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/pkk-terror-group-status_b_3289311.html. last accessed on 
April 24, 2016. 
84
 For an excellent article on this, see Sproat (1997) Can the state commit acts of terrorism?: An opinion and 
some qualitative replies to a questionnair, last accessed on April 27, 2016. 
85
 Beck & Miner argue that categorization of militant groups rely on “organizational markers of threat”. For the 
American and British governments at least, organizations which are Islamic and attack aviation are more likely 
to be listed” (Beck & Miner 2013: 857) 
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A different, redefined discourse of terrorism should deploy an anthropological holistic approach 
as one of its main instruments to gather data. What the general public, government officials and 
others might view as irrational, ineffective or amoral behavior, anthropologists can contextualize and 
offer moral and cultural embeddedness through a richer understanding of symbolic action. 
Correspondingly, like Sageman I am convinced that detailed accounts, what anthropologists call 
‘‘thick description”, should be applied in terrorism research (Sageman 2014: 571/572).This is 
important because anthropologists are skilled to explore and analyse multifaceted data surrounding 
the motivation to turn to political violence. The academic community should practice the use of 
extensive field studies regarding terrorism-related research topics as this prevents us from 
performing guesswork due to lack of context. In line with the averting of simple speculation, I argue, 
like Zulaika and Douglass, to cease promoting terrorism as a quintessential threat: “To taboo and 
demonize them further accomplishes little and is indeed counterproductive, since such imagination 
confers upon the violent actors the mythical power of fabled martyrs or monsters” (Zulaika and 
Douglass 1996: x, 1996). We should take a stand on the perception that “symbolic moral universes” 
of terrorism and civilization are clashing (Ben Yehuda 2003: 50). 
Finally, I did not intend to demonstrate my symphathy for those described terrorirsts, yet I 
also do not condemn the existence of underlying political motivations, rational choice and suffering. 
In reference to the supposed terror struck world we live in today, I align with Zulaika in reporting that: 
“(...) we are all included in the picture, and these tragic events must make us problematize our own 
innocence while questioning our own political and libidinal investment in the global terrorism 
discourse” (Zulaika 2003: 198). Turk (2004) sums this up nicely as follows: “(...) to study terrorism 
presupposes investigating the ways in which parties in conflict are trying to stigmatize one another” 
(Turk 2004: 273). 
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Further Research Implications 
On gathering literature to be analysed on neo-Orientalist tenets I was mindful of the proportion of 
articles titles within the journal Terrorism and Political Violence which relate to the Middle-East. 
Hence, I glanced over each issue from the journal and generated a visualization of the results (based 
on measurement of Table 5. Attachments): 
This image suggests a drastic increase in the focus of of terrorist experts on terrorism related to the 
Middle-East. More interestingly, with the exception of the 1996 Islamic Fundamentalism Special 
outlier, an increased level of attention regarding Orient related topics can be identified from 2001 
onwards. Do the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have something to do with this? Well, seeing that many 
countries followed the U.S. decision to dramatically increase its funding into terrorism studies after 
the attacks it could be argued, yes it does (Sageman 2014: 566). Given that there are theoretical 
limitations to this model (such as as a usual time gap between events [9/11] itself and scholarly work 
covering it, or perhaps a biased too-inclusive perspective to what relates to the Middle-East. 
However further research on this topic is clearly needed. 
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Attachments 
 
Table 1. 
Israeli organisations labelled terrorist 
86
 Palestinian organisations labelled terrorist
87
 
 Brit HaKanaim (1950-53) 
 Malchut Israel (1950s) 
 Gush Emunim Underground (1979-
84) 
 Keshet (Kvutza Shelo Titpasher 1981 - 
1989) 
 Bat Ayin 
 Lehava 
 Sikrikim 
 Kach and Kahane Chai 
 Hamas 
 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
 Harakat Al-Shabireen 
 Palestine Islamic Jihad 
 Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) 
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General 
Command (PFLP-GC) 
 
Terms, concepts and famous historical events
88
 
 Ancient history: both Jews and Arabs claim historical ancestry in region 
 19th century: Ottoman Empire controls Palestine; small Jewish community; Theodor Herzl develops plans 
for Zionist homeland. / Zionism refers to the movement to create a Jewish state in the Middle East, roughly 
corresponding to the historical land of Israel, and thus support for the modern state of Israel. Anti-Zionism 
opposes that
89
 
 1910s: Chaim Weizmann lobbies British to support Zionist plans 
 1916: Sykes-Picot (British-French) agreement divides Arabian peninsula between British and French; 
Palestine left an international zone 
 1917: Balfour Declaration announces support of British government for “the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people,” while insisting also upon the rights of non-Jewish peoples 
 1921: First Palestinian uprisings against Zionist settlement (Jaffa). Some migration of European Jews to 
Palestine:  
 1935-39: Major Palestinian uprising against Zionist settlements; British disarm Palestinian groups in 
aftermath 
 1940s: Armed Zionist groups pressure British to allow Israeli statehood (1944 Stern Gang assassination of 
British Secretary of State Lord Moyne; 1946 bombing of King David Hotel, with at least 88 killed) 
 1945-50: US and Britain refuse to open doors to Jewish holocaust refugees, directing flow of migrants to 
Israel 
 1948: Deir Yassin massacre, 250 killed by Menachim Begin’s troops; flight of as many as 900,000 unarmed 
Palestinians to surrounding Arab states; Israeli statehood proclaimed, recognized by US and 32 other states 
at UN (13 against, 10 abstentions); Palestinians and surrounding Arab states reject Israeli statehood, war 
ensues 
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 Via: http://www.iyfnshm.com/?dn=cdi.org&pid=9PO7PUW67,  last accessed on March 7, 2016. 
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 Via: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/paltertoc.html,  last accessed on March 7, 2016. 
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 Via: http://www.peoplesgeographyproject.org/Timeline.htm, last accessed on June 7, 2016. 
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 Via: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36160928, last accessed on June 9, 2016. 
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 1950s: Israel wins series of military conflicts with Arab states, solidifying position and laying permanent 
claim to former Palestinian lands 
 1950s-60s: Beginnings of officially-recognized Middle East terrorism problems, including airplane hijackings 
and bombings, first carried out by Israel, eventually by Palestinians and others; Ariel Sharon’s unit commits 
massacre at Qibya in 1953 
 1964: Founding of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
 1967: Israel defeats Egypt in 6-day war, claiming former Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and consolidating 
further US military and economic support; West Bank and Gaza Strip occupied, leading to more Palestinian 
support for PLO 
 1972: Islamic terrorist group kills Israeli athletes at Munich Olympics 
 1974: Oil shocks focus global attention on Middle East; PLO implies willingness to recognize Israel in 
exchange for end of occupation 
 1978: US, Israel, and Egypt sign Camp David Peace Accords, returning land to Egypt and buying Egypt out of 
pro-Palestinian camp 
 1982: Operation Peace for Galilee launched, with Israeli forces invading southern Lebanon; operation leads 
to more than 17,000 Arab deaths and culminates in massacres of thousands of civilians at Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps 
 1987: Beginning of “intifida,” Palestinian uprising in occupied territories 
 1988: PLO declares independent Palestinian state, recognized by over 100 nations at UN, but not by US; 
PLO reaffirms recognition of Israel’s existence as part of two-state settlement proposal 
 1988-89: US-led negotiations and Israeli military response defuse “intifada” 
 1990: Massacre of Palestinians at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem 
 1993: Yassir Arafat and Itzaak Rabin sign Oslo Peace Accords, leading to formation of Palestinian Authority 
in Gaza and parts of West Bank; many Palestinians reject the legitimacy of this authority; some support 
swings from PLO to Hamas 
 1995: Itzaak Rabin assassinated by Zionist extremists 
 2000-01: Ariel Sharon visit to al-Aqsa mosque, with implicit backing of Ehud Barak government, triggers 
Palestinian uprising both in occupied territories and within Israel; Israeli military responds with massive 
repression (tanks, helicopter gunships, missiles) 
 2001: Sharon defeats Barak in election, becomes Prime Minister; in wake of September 11 World Trade 
Center disaster, Israeli repression in the occupied territories intensifies 
 
 
Table 2. 
All volumes and issues within the journal Terrorism and Political Violence. 
Published 28 Volumes = from the years 1989 up to 2016 (start 1989) 
Published 84
90
 + 26
91
 issues 
 
= 110 issues (1989 t/m 2016 - 28 Volumes) 
 
Source: Terrorism and Political Violence 
 
                                                          
90
 4*21 -- Issues frequency * years. 
91
 5*5(+1)  -- Issues frequency * years (+1 issue of 2016). 
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Table 3.    
Framing of Jewish terrorist (JT) Palestinian terrorist (PT) and  
(B/N) both or none. 
Publication 
1) A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of 
Israel 
  Volume 13 Issue 
2 pp. 1-26. 
2) Analogies to Terror: The Construction of Social Problems in Israel During the 
Intifada Al Aqsa 
  Volume 18 Issue 
3 pp. 389-398. 
3) Between diffusion and territorial consolidation in rebellion: Striking at the 
hard core of the Intifada 
 Vol. 3 Iss. 4 pp. 
39-62. 
4) CAN ISRAEL SURVIVE THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS? 
  Volume 16 Issue 
1 pp. 48-65. 
5) Christmas in Gaza: An Adventitious War? 
  Volume 21 Issue 
3 pp. 516-523. 
6) Combating right‐wing political extremism in Israel: Critical appraisal 
  Volume 9 Issue 4 
pp. 82-105. 
7) Menachem Klein (1996) Competing brothers: The web of Hamas‐PLO relations 
  Volume 8 Issue 2 
pp. 111-132. 
8) Oldmixon, Rosenson & Wald (2005) Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion 
Race Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives 1997–2002 
  Volume 17 Issue 
3 pp. 407-426. 
9) Byman (2012) Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second 
Intifada 
  Volume 24 Issue 
5 pp. 825-852. 
10) Doomsday in Jerusalem? Christian Messianic Groups and the Rebuilding of the 
Temple  
Volume 13, Issue 
1, pp. 1-14 
11) Frisch (2010) Debating Palestinian strategy in the al-Aqsa intifada 
  Volume 15 Issue 
2 pp. 61-80. 
12) Le Vine & Salert (1996) Does a coercive official response deter terrorism? The 
case of the PLO 
  Volume 8 Issue 1 
pp. 22-49. 
13) Israeli (2000) Education identity state building and the peace process: 
Educating Palestinian children in the post‐Oslo era 
  Volume 12 Issue 
1 pp. 79-94. 
14) Education indoctrination and incitement: Palestinian children on their way to 
martyrdom 
  Volume 15 Issue 
1 pp. 96-123. 
15) Sprinzak (2000) Extemism and violence in Israeli democracy 
  Volume 12 Issue 
3-4 pp. 209-236. 
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16) From repression to facilitation: The effects of Israeli policies on Palestinian 
mobilization in the west bank 1967–1987 
  Volume 8 Issue 1 
pp. 1-21. 
17) Bhasin & Hallward (2013) Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization in the 
Palestinian Territories 
  Volume 25 Issue 
1 pp. 75-93. 
18) Haram or Halal? Islamists' Use of Suicide Attacks as “Jihad”  
 Volume 23, Issue 
4, pp. 582-601 
19) Hamas: Suicide Bombings Rockets or WMD? 
  Volume 14 Issue 
3 pp. 109-128. 
20) Frisch (2005) Has the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Become Islamic? Fatah Islam 
and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 
  Volume 17 Issue 
3 pp. 391-406. 
21) Cohen & Dudai (2005) Human Rights Dilemmas in Using Informers to Combat 
Terrorism: The Israeli-Palestinian Case 
  Volume 17 Issue 
1-2 pp. 229-243. 
22) Israeli (1997) Islamikaze and their significance 
  Volume 9 Issue 3 
pp. 96-121. 
23) Milton-Edwards (2014) Islamist Versus Islamist: Rising Challenge in Gaza 
  Volume 26 Issue 
2 pp. 259-276. 
24) Freilich (2015) Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?   pp. 1-18 
25) Israeli perceptions of the Palestinians’ ‘limited violence’ in the Intifada   pp. 1-18 
26) Silber (2010) Israel's Policy of House Demolitions During the First Intifada 
1987–1993 
  Volume 23 Issue 
1 pp. 89-107. 
27) Legitimizing Pragmatism: Hamas' Framing Efforts From Militancy to 
Moderation and Back? 
  Volume 22 Issue 
3 pp. 357-377. 
28) Making Palestinian “Martyrdom Operations”/“Suicide Attacks”: Interviews 
With Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers 
  Volume 22 Issue 
1 pp. 102-119. 
29) Muslim fundamentalists as social revolutionaries: The case of Israel 
  Volume 6 Issue 4 
pp. 462-475. 
30) PALESTINIAN WOMEN: THE QUEST FOR A VOICE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
THROUGH “ISLAMIKAZE MARTYRDOM”
1
 
  Volume 16 Issue 
1 pp. 66-96. 
31) Personality Characteristics of “Self Martyrs”/“Suicide Bombers” and 
Organizers of Suicide Attacks 
  Volume 22 Issue 
1 pp. 87-101. 
32) Precision Terror: Suicide Bombing as Control Technology 
  Volume 19 Issue 
2 pp. 223-245. 
50 
 
33) Political, Religious, and Psychological Characteristics of Muslim Protest 
Marchers in Eight European Cities: Jerusalem Day 2002   
Volume 17, Issue 
4, pp. 551-572 
34) Psyoping Hezbollah: The Israeli Psychological Warfare Campaign During the 
2006 Lebanon War   
Volume 21, Issue 
2, pp. 221-238 
35) Questioning the Frame: The Canadian, Israeli and US Reports 
Volume 14, Issue 
1, pp. 109-122 
36) Rynhold (2006) Religion Postmodernization and Israeli Approaches to the 
Conflict with the Palestinians 
  Volume 17 Issue 
3 pp. 371-389. 
37) Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber 
Volume 27, Issue 
1, pp. 53-80 
38) Religious Violence in Judaism: Past and Present 
  Volume 25 Issue 
3 pp. 355-405. 
39) Sandler (1996) Religious zionism and the state: Political accommodation and 
religious radicalism in Israel 
  Volume 8 Issue 2 
pp. 133-154. 
40) Saudi-Palestinian Relations During the Run-Up to and the Aftermath of Black 
September   
Volume 26, Issue 
4, pp. 713-724 
41) Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad 
  Volume 17 Issue 
4 pp. 573-598. 
42) Israeli (1998) The Arabs in Israel: Identity criminality and the peace process 
  Volume 10 Issue 
1 pp. 39-59. 
43) The Challenge of Talking about Terrorism: The EU and the Arab Debate on the 
Causes of Islamist Terrorism  
Volume 21, Issue 
4, pp. 539-557 
44) The Changing Jewish Discourse on Armed Conflict: Themes and Implications  
Volume 17, Issue 
3, pp. 353-370 
45) The Intellectual Foundations of Jewish National Terrorism: Avraham Stern and 
the Lehi 
  Volume 25 Issue 
4 pp. 606-620. 
46) The Israeli defense forces and unconventional warfare: The Palestinian factor 
and Israeli national security doctrine 
  Volume 2 Issue 2 
pp. 212-226. 
47) Cubert (1992) The militant palestinian organizations and the Arab‐Israeli 
peace process 
 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 
pp. 22-43. 
48) The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's 
The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right 
  Volume 5 Issue 1 
pp. 132-159. 
51 
 
49) Sivan (1991) The Mythologies of Religious Radicalism Judaism and Islam 
  
Vol. 3 Iss. 3 1991 
50) The social and religious characteristics of suicide bombers and their victims 
  Volume 15 Issue 
3 pp. 139-153. 
51) Catagnani (2005) The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The 
Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror 
Volume 17, Issue 
1-2, pp. 245-264 
52) Uncovering the urban dimension in nationalist conflict: Jerusalem and Belfast 
compared  
Volume 10, Issue 
1, pp. 1-38 
53) Vigilant Jewish fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or ‘Shalom Jews 
Shalom Dogs') 
  Volume 4 Issue 1 
pp. 44-66. 
54) Matesan (2012) What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the 
Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process 
  Volume 24 Issue 
5 pp. 671-705. 
55) Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers? 
  Volume 16 Issue 
4 pp. 815-840. 
56) Pratt (2013) “Anyone Who Hurts Us”: How the Logic of Israel's “Assassination 
Policy” Developed During the Aqsa Intifada 
  Volume 25 Issue 
2 pp. 224-245. 
Source: Terrorism and Political Violence 
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Table 4. 
Article list reassessed 
Article clearly 
deals with  
Jewish 
terrorism 
(JT). 
Article clearly 
deals with 
Palestinian 
terrorism 
(PT). 
 
(B/N) included both types: JT+PT, 
(though, in comparison, less 
prominently JT), or further in-depth 
research spelled out that neither JT 
nor PT was patently framed. 
 Volume 28 2016 - 1 - 
 Volume 27 2015 - 1 1 
 Volume 26 2014 - - 1+1 
 Volume 25 2013 1+1 - 1+1 
 Volume 24 2012 - - 1+1 
 Volume 23 2011 - - 1 
 Volume 22 2010 - 1+1+1 1 
 Volume 21 2009 - - 1+1 
 Volume 20 2008 - - - 
 Volume 19 2007 - - - 
 Volume 18 2006 - 1 - 
 Volume 17 2005 - 1+1 1+1+1+1+1+1 
 Volume 16 2004 - 1+1+1 - 
 Volume 15 2003 - 1+1+1 1 
 Volume 14 2002 - 1 1 
 Volume 13 2001 (9/11)         - 1 1 
 Volume 12 2000 1 - 1 
 Volume 11 1999 - - - 
 Volume 10 1998 - - 1+1 
 Volume 9 1997 1 - 1 
 Volume 8 1996 1 1+ 1 1+192  
 Volume 7 1995 - 1 - 
 Volume 6 1994 - 1 - 
 Volume 5 1993 1 - - 
 Volume 4 1992 1 - 1 
 Volume 3 1991 - 1+1 1 
 Volume 2 1990 - - - 
 Volume 1 1989 - - - 
Total 7 + 22 + 
 
    28 = 57 
 
Source: Terrorism and Political Violence 
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 Special Issue about slamic radical/fundamentalism yet not Palestinian terrorism particularly. 
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Table 5. 
                                                          
93
 Special Issue: Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism. 
94
 Special Issue: Irish Violence. 
95
 2001, the year in which 9/11 happened. 
96
 Special Issue: Islamic Fundamentalism. 
Volumes / Issues 
Proportion ‘The Middle-East’-
Articles / Orginal Articles 
% Percentage ‘The Middle-East’-
Articles / Orginal Articles 
i.  Volume 28 2016 2/8 2/8= 25% 
ii.  Volume 27 2015 2/7*2/8*3/10*1/7*4/8 12/40= 30% 
iii.  Volume 26 2014 2/5*2/12*2/7*1/7* 2/1493 9/45= 20% 
iv.  Volume 25 2013 1/8*1/10*1/6*4/9*(1)/8 8/41= 19.5% 
v.  Volume 24 2012 2/8*0/8*0/7*4/10* 0/7 6/40= 15% 
vi.  Volume 23 2011 
2/7*4/8*1/8*3/8 
*2/10 
12/41= 29% 
vii.  Volume 22 2010 3/8*2/5*3/7*2/6 10/26= 38.5% 
viii.  Volume 21 2009 1/5*1/9*3/8*1/8 6/30= 20% 
ix.  Volume 20 2007-008 10/11*0/5*2/6*1/6 13/28= 46.4% 
x.  Volume 19 2007 2/8*1/6*1/5*4/7 8/26= 30.8% 
xi.  Volume 18 2006 1/6*4/6*4/8*1/9 10/29= 34.5% 
xii.  Volume 17 2005 4/5*6/10*2/13 12/28= 42.9% 
xiii.  Volume 16 2004 3/9*0/1594*4/9*4/7 11/40= 27.5% 
xiv.  Volume 15 2003 1/10*4/10*1/6*3/8 9/34= 26.5% 
xv.  Volume 14 2002 3/8*1/6*1/5*(1)/11 6/30= 20% 
xvi.  Volume 13 200195 1/6*1/6/*1/7*0/8 3/27= 11.1% 
xvii.  Volume 12 2000 1/12(III*IV)*0/4*1/9 2/25= 8% 
xviii.  Volume 11 1999 1/16*1/3*0/4*1/4 3/27= 11.1% 
xix.  Volume 10 1998 1/8*0/9*0/5*2/7 3/28= 10.7% 
xx.  Volume 9 1997 1/6*1/6*1/8*0/9 3/29= 10.3% 
xxi.  Volume 8 1996 0/7*0/4*12/14* 2/8 14/35= 42.9%96 
xxii.  Volume 7 1995 0/9*0/6*1/5*0/9 1/29= 3.5% 
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Source: Terrorism and Political Violence 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97
 Special Issue: Western Responses to Terrorism. 
xxiii.  Volume 6 1994 2/8*1/6 *1/5*0/5 4/24= 16.7% 
xxiv.  Volume 5 1993 0/5*0/6*0/9*0/5 0/25= 0% 
xxv.  Volume 4 1992 0/1197 *0/4*0/7*1/5 1/27= 4% 
xxvi.  Volume 3 1991 2/7*3/7*0/7*0/8 5/29= 17.2% 
xxvii.  Volume 2 1990 0/7*0/9*1/5*0/6 1/27= 4% 
xxviii.  Volume 1 1989 0/6*0/6*1/5*0/6 1/23= 4.3% 
